Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; Second International John S. Baras,Jonathan Katz,Eitan Altman Conference proceedings 2011 Springer-V

negotiable

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1613-4 of nature. The defense strategies include both actions where security generates positive externalities and actions that do not. When the players are assumed to be risk averse, market insurance enters as a third strategic option. We formulate a one-shot security game with market insurance, character

誰在削木頭

Equipment and Physical Infrastructure through traditional means such as by using antivirus and antivirus softwares. In reality, an Internet user faces risks due to security attacks as well as risks due to non-security related failures (e.g., reliability faults in the form of hardware crash, buffer overflow, etc.). These risk types are

CYN

K. Siddique-e Rabbani,Trevor D. Cradduck within a market and which, if any, become dominant. In this paper, we introduce a model for Dynamic Influence in Competitive Environments (DICE). We show that existing models of influence propagation, including linear threshold and independent cascade models, can be derived as special cases of DICE

輕快來事

Cari Borrás,K. Siddique-e Rabbanin-based service (LBS) with their current coordinates. However, LBS providers collect a significant amount of data from mobile users and could be tempted to misuse it, by compromising a customer’s location privacy (her ability to control the information about her past and present location). Many solu

Regurgitation

Dusan Paredes,Marcelo Lufin,Patricio Arocat investigating various aspects of digital trust decisions. Digital trust in online environments differs from its offline variants due to its unique characteristics such as near instantaneous communication, transient and impersonal nature of interactions, immediate access to opinions of others, and

jumble

vertebrate

Fernando Rubiera-Morollón,Ana Vi?uela’ services based on the extent of privacy that firms are able to provide. Kantarcioglu et.al. (2010) [9] contributes to guidelines for entrepreneurs’ adoption decisions through a novel framework, which combines copula functions and a Stackelberg leader-follower game with consumers taking the role of

strain

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3346-3ion links. In this regard, the security of individual nodes depend not only on their own efforts, but also on the efforts and underlying connectivity structure of neighboring network nodes. By the term ‘effort’, we imply the amount of investments made by a user in security mechanisms like antivirus

衰弱的心

現(xiàn)任者

978-3-642-25279-2Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2011