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Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; First International Tansu Alpcan,Levente Buttyán,John S. Baras Conference proceedings 2010 Springer

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樓主: Monsoon
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 18:14:10 | 只看該作者
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 05:16:57 | 只看該作者
Optimal Information Security Investment with Penetration Testingurity practitioners. This paper adds penetration testing to the realm of information security investment. Penetration testing is modeled as an information gathering option to reduce uncertainty in a discrete time, finite horizon, player-versus-nature, weakest-link security game. We prove that once s
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 07:33:35 | 只看該作者
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 14:16:22 | 只看該作者
gPath: A Game-Theoretic Path Selection Algorithm to Protect Tor’s Anonymityhe problem as a repeated non-cooperative game between the defender and the adversary (i.e., controller of the compromised Tor nodes to carry out entry-exit linking attacks). Given the current path selection algorithm of Tor, we derive an optimal attack strategy for the adversary according to its uti
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 16:54:13 | 只看該作者
When Do Firms Invest in Privacy-Preserving Technologies?privacy that firms are able to provide, for example, the use of certain banking services, health care information technology [7]...etc. Firms thus face crucial assessment of investment on privacy-preserving technologies. Two important factors affect firms’ valuation: (1) a customer’s valuation of hi
48#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 23:12:15 | 只看該作者
Adversarial Control in a Delay Tolerant Networksource’s objective is to choose transmission probabilities so as to maximize the probability of successful delivery of some content to the destination within a deadline. These transmissions are subject to interference from a jammer who is a second, adversarial type controller, We solve three variant
49#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 02:48:49 | 只看該作者
Security Interdependencies for Networked Control Systems with Identical Agentsced risks. Each plant is modeled by a discrete-time stochastic linear system, which is sensed and controlled over a communication network. We model security decisions of the individual systems (also called players) as a game. We consider a two-stage game, in which first, the players choose whether t
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 04:54:53 | 只看該作者
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