Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 5th International Co Radha Poovendran,Walid Saad Conference proceedings 2014 Springer International

In-Situ

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2802-5he . (SMDG). This game is played between the . (i.e., the D2D network) which abstracts all legitimate network devices and the . which abstracts any adversary that can inject different malicious messages into the D2D network in order, for instance, to infect a device with malware. Simulation results

nerve-sparing

Solid-State Reactions between Oxides each player subject to its resource constraint. At the third stage, the players and the adversary fight against each other with updated resource levels and battlefields. We compute the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for this game. Further, we show that when playing according to the equilibrium, t

吸引力

匍匐

Favorable

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6821-9nticipate the Cloud provider’s behavior; we then derive the minimum verification resource requirement, and the optimal strategy of the verifier. Finally, our game theoretical model is validated by showing correctness of the analytical results via simulation on a case study.

ingenue

MAL

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2802-5 and study their best strategies, we introduce two control models: in the AND model, the attacker has to compromise all resources in order to take over the entire system, while in the OR model, she has to compromise only one. Our analytical and numerical results provide practical recommendations for defenders.

Immunoglobulin

Realizable Rational Multiparty Cryptographic Protocolsr to facilitate the design of protocols in the real world. Our results specify a modified ideal and real world model that account for the presence of point-to-point communication channels between players, where security is achieved through the simulation paradigm.

Panacea

FlipThem : Modeling Targeted Attacks with FlipIt for Multiple Resources and study their best strategies, we introduce two control models: in the AND model, the attacker has to compromise all resources in order to take over the entire system, while in the OR model, she has to compromise only one. Our analytical and numerical results provide practical recommendations for defenders.

visual-cortex

Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Adaptive Cyber-Defense Scenario (Preliminary?Report)ns of this environment. The results show how strategic outcomes vary qualitatively with environment conditions, and demonstrate the value of reliable probe detection in setting up an effective deterrent to attack.