Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 5th International Co Radha Poovendran,Walid Saad Conference proceedings 2014 Springer International

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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)




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Optimal Contracts for Outsourced Computationweaker notion of security, i.e., “l(fā)azy-but-honest” contractors. Targeting this type of agents, we develop optimal contracts for outsourcing of computational tasks via appropriate use of rewards, punishments, auditing rate, and “redundancy”. Our contracts provably minimize the expense of the outsourc

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A Supervisory Control Approach to Dynamic Cyber-Securityamic security problem from the defender’s point of view as a supervisory control problem with imperfect information, modeling the computer network’s operation by a discrete event system. We consider a min-max performance criterion and use dynamic programming to determine, within a restricted set of

白楊魚

Numerical Computation of Multi-goal Security Strategiesiple and often interdependent aspects. . are behavior profiles that guarantee some performance . of how the adversary really behaves (provided that it stays within its action set). While security strategies towards a single goal are easy to compute via Nash-equilibria (or refinements thereof), playi

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Limiting Adversarial Budget in Quantitative Security Assessmentd by Buldas-Stepanenko in 2012 and improved in 2013 by Buldas and Lenin. In the previously presented models attacker’s budget was assumed to be unlimited. It is natural to assume that the adversarial budget is limited and such an assumption would allow us to model the adversarial decision making mor

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