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Titlebook: Decision Processes in Economics; Proceedings of the V Gianni Ricci Conference proceedings 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Diffe

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樓主: fumble
31#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 23:21:25 | 只看該作者
Epistemic Reasoning in Life and Literatureve games with coalitional structures as established by Aumann and Drèze (1974), a unique allocation rule which is both efficient and fair can be derived and shown to be essentially given by the Shapley value of a restricted game. Furthermore, it turns out that if the game is superadditive, then the
32#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 03:43:25 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5374-7tion, that incorporates asymmetric information between the private sector and the monetary authority. In this model, the private sector is a passive player who simply forms conditional (rational) expectations of the current inflation rate, which constitutes the surprise component of the policy maker
33#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 07:51:09 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5374-7rkers’ income share. Recently it is been studied in a noncooperative dynamic game setting by Balbucci, Candela and Ricci [1]. They found that it is not possible to eliminate the Cycle but it is possible to locate the Golden Age point in a position where the employment rate value is determined by wor
34#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 10:00:26 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5374-7always the same firm to innovate first, i.e what generates .. The analysis is carried out within a (pure) horizontal product differentiation model in an infinitely repeated game form. Firms are identical and have perfect information. Although I will deal only with the three firms case, diffusion sho
35#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 16:13:41 | 只看該作者
36#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 20:36:17 | 只看該作者
37#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 01:33:51 | 只看該作者
38#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 05:31:18 | 只看該作者
,Axiomatization in Hilbert’s Early Career,g solution in the former case and a weak solution in the latter (the possibility that the algorithm produces no solution at all will also be considered). Such an algorithm is meant to represent a chain of deductions from the basic assumption that each player is rational and rationality is common kno
39#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 08:13:30 | 只看該作者
Epistemic Reasoning in Life and Literaturef the grand coalition is taken for granted. This of course is not the case in many practical situations where only partial cooperation may be sought by some of the players. In several circumstances this may be due to a lack of communication among several participants. These situations were first con
40#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 11:44:26 | 只看該作者
Outstanding Contributions to Logico take into account the risk associated to each investment. The set of admissible portofolio becomes a two dimensional set and utility function has to be modified introducing risk which, in a rational market, is directly proportional to return. When it is possible to find a line of efficient portfol
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