Titlebook: Decision Processes in Economics; Proceedings of the V Gianni Ricci Conference proceedings 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Diffe

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apiary

FLASK

矛盾

Acetaldehyde

Robust Lyapunov Games: The Continuous-Time Case,e games are uncertain in the following sense. None of the players knows exactly the constraints facing it or its opponent. Possibly, even the opponent’s strategies are unknown. However, each player is assumed to know with certainty that the true game lies within a known, bounded class of games. Opti

Lament

Piecewise Deterministic and Piecewise Diffusion Differential Games with Modal Uncertainties,essive random jump times the process is either fully deterministic or is represented as a diffusion process obeying an Ito equation. In the piecewise deterministic case one considers the class of . strategies: Each player uses an open-loop control which can be modified and adapted to the current sta

Lament

Algorithmic Solutions for Extensive Games,g solution in the former case and a weak solution in the latter (the possibility that the algorithm produces no solution at all will also be considered). Such an algorithm is meant to represent a chain of deductions from the basic assumption that each player is rational and rationality is common kno

dyspareunia

Communication Games,f the grand coalition is taken for granted. This of course is not the case in many practical situations where only partial cooperation may be sought by some of the players. In several circumstances this may be due to a lack of communication among several participants. These situations were first con

plasma-cells

Bargaining and Optimal Investments,o take into account the risk associated to each investment. The set of admissible portofolio becomes a two dimensional set and utility function has to be modified introducing risk which, in a rational market, is directly proportional to return. When it is possible to find a line of efficient portfol

技術(shù)

Robust Lyapunov Games: The Continuous-Time Case,’s strategies are unknown. However, each player is assumed to know with certainty that the true game lies within a known, bounded class of games. Optimal and beneficial solutions to the uncertain Lyapunov games are derived, and their basic properties are investigated.