Titlebook: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -- CHES 2011; 13th International W Bart Preneel,Tsuyoshi Takagi Conference proceedings 2011 Int

教育學(xué)

Chinese Academy of Cyberspace Studiestilize them. For cryptographic use-cases, this can be very effective due to the demand for non-standard or niche operations that are not supported by general-purpose architectures. However, one disadvantage of fixed-function ISEs is inflexibility, contradicting a need for “algorithm agility.” This p

油氈

Tom Short,Tom Stehlik,Janene Piip flip-flops. Metastability is achieved by using precise programmable delay lines (PDL) that accurately equalize the signal arrival times to flip-flops. The PDLs are capable of adjusting signal propagation delays with resolutions higher than fractions of a pico second. In addition, a real time monito

GEST

mucous-membrane

Tom Short,Tom Stehlik,Janene Piiphave shown that collision-correlation power analysis is able to recover the secret keys on embedded implementations. However, we noticed that the attack published last year by Moradi et al. is not efficient on correctly first-order protected implementations. We propose in this paper improvements on

Dorsal

To Build Smart Sensors Using MEMS is nowadays an important topic. In parallel, another class of attacks, called ., have been investigated which exploit the hardware glitches phenomena occurring during the physical execution of algorithms. We introduce in this paper a circuit model that encompasses sufficient conditions to resist gl

完全

Neroli Sheldon,Michelle Wallacelock cipher implementations is masking, which randomizes the variables to be protected by combining them with one or several random values. In this paper, we propose an original masking scheme based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme?[22] as an alternative to Boolean masking. We detail its implementa

emission

飛行員

Tom Short,Tom Stehlik,Janene Piipnatures per second on an elliptic curve at a 2. security level. Public keys are 32 bytes, and signatures are 64 bytes. These performance figures include strong defenses against software side-channel attacks: there is no data flow from secret keys to array indices, and there is no data flow from secr

Affectation

Obstreperous