Titlebook: Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns; Empirical Evidence f Andreas Schillhofer Book 2003 Deutscher Universit?ts-Verlag/GWV Fachv

吞食

書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns被引頻次




書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns年度引用




書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns讀者反饋




書目名稱Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

芳香一點(diǎn)

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework, on Corporate Governance. It builds on the property rights theory, since it deals with the delegation of control rights from the principal to the agent. The principal-agent relationship can be defined as “[...] a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the

orthopedist

Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance,hanisms. or into exante preventive and ex-post corrective control mechanisms.. The classification into internal and external mechanisms refers to whether the respective mechanism is initiated and conducted through internal institutionalized channels and procedures or through external parties beyond

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充足

obstinate

obstinate

Mingxin Zhang,Qiuyu Wu,Yongjun Liu on Corporate Governance. It builds on the property rights theory, since it deals with the delegation of control rights from the principal to the agent. The principal-agent relationship can be defined as “[...] a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the

歌劇等

Guojun Wang,Xuemin Lin,Genggeng Liuhanisms. or into exante preventive and ex-post corrective control mechanisms.. The classification into internal and external mechanisms refers to whether the respective mechanism is initiated and conducted through internal institutionalized channels and procedures or through external parties beyond

byline

Bin Xu,Sheng Yan,Kening Gao,Yu Zhang,Ge Yud induced agency costs and increase firm value. While there are a number of studies which analyze the relationship between Corporate Governance and firm value, the link between Governance mechanisms and the required rate of return is largely unexplored. Lombardo and Pagano (2002) argue that this is

GUEER

Xin Wang,Rui Zhang,Yang-Sae Moonthey are willing to pay significant premiums for well-governed companies, and that Corporate Governance practices are at least important as financial indicators when evaluating investment decisions. While the relationship between legal Governance variables and firm performance has been analyzed in n