| 書目名稱 | Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets |
| 編輯 | Milan Horniacek |
| 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/238/237904/237904.mp4 |
| 概述 | The unified analysis of existence and efficiency properties of equilibria provides justification for economic policy reforms.The analysis of cooperative managerial capitalism is interesting for econom |
| 叢書名稱 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |
| 圖書封面 |  |
| 描述 | The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms‘ average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2011 |
| 關(guān)鍵詞 | Coalitions; Collusion; Competition/Antitrust Policy; Natural Oligopoly; Repeated Games |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19763-5 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-642-19762-8 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-19763-5Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 |
| issn_series | 0075-8442 |
| copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011 |
|Archiver|手機(jī)版|小黑屋|
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