Titlebook: Conversations on African Philosophy of Mind, Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence; Aribiah David Attoe,Segun Samuel Temitope,Jonathan

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epidermis

Gyekye and Contemporary Idealismern hegemony of materialist philosophy of mind and its origins in Gilbert Ryle’s . (1949), showing that the existence and nature of the traditional Akan philosophy, as elaborated by Gyekye, casts serious doubt on some influential founding motivations for materialism. I then argue that traditional Ak

indigenous

A Central State Materialistic Interpretation of the Yoruba Concept of Person: A Critiquework of central state materialism, which states that mental events are identifiable with physical events occurring in the brain and central nervous system. This is because . (human body), which is purely physical, can be taken to perform both material and immaterial functions. The chapter argues tha

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Commonplace

An Alternative Response to the Knowledge Argumentive African statement of the ability reply, and, at the very least, in a novel way turns the negative ability reply into a positive reply to Frank Jackson’s formulation of the knowledge argument. For Wiredu the mind is not taken as a distinct substance, but rather as a cognitive ability; while for L

雜役

Epistemological Implications of Chimakonam’s Theory of Sense-Phenomenalism physical features that are sensually perceptible by other humans in society. I argue in this work that this theory has some implications for the theory of knowledge. First, it leads to the belief that we can only gain knowledge through the ‘other’, which further suggests that the individual cannot

雜役

Traditional African Philosophy of Mind and World: Facilitating a Dialoguehuman person. The objective is to frame the discipline by reference to the norms internal to philosophy as a social practice, thus facilitating dialogue across traditions. The obstacle lies in the oversight of such normative framing in the more dominant Analytic approach to the philosophy of mind, f

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