Titlebook: Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models; Jaeyoung Sung Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under

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Hierarchical Contracting: A Mean-Volatility Control Problemerial performance metrics which are optimal to the top manager may not necessarily be optimal to the principal. Another numerical example shows that the profit-sharing features of middle managerial contracts can be desirable for a sufficiently large firm, but not for a sufficiently small firm.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-34397-4ement in various forms. We briefly review the history of modern contract theory and discuss basic issues in contracting decisions which eventually boil down to tradeoffs between risk/uncertainty sharing and incentives.

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Incisor

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P. F. Cavagnaro,C. R. Galmarini moral hazard, the optimal contract decision is a tradeoff between the benefit of improving the agent’s work incentives and the cost of sacrificing the risk-sharing efficiency, and that the optimal performance metric for the optimal contract is a combination of the outcome and relevant signals which

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Techniken der Verifikation und Validierung,e study effects of learning?on the optimal contract. In particular, we examine two cases: (1) a parameter is an unknown constant and (2) it is an unknown BM process with a linear drift. The first case extends the Holmstr?m–Milgrom model by allowing the information about the unknown parameter to be u

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Arthropathy