Titlebook: Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are not Machines; James H. Fetzer Book 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001 Prolog.artif

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Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are not Machines978-94-010-0973-7Series ISSN 0924-0780

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2223-5radition associated especially with the name of René Descartes and the . tradition associated with B.F. Skinner. Dualism is strongly anti-reductionistic, insofar as mentality is taken be different than and not reducible to behavior. Behaviorism, by contrast, is strongly reductionistic, taking mental

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-34287-0izes in the “Series Foreword” as “brain-style computation”. In the Preface, the three editors (including Rumelhart) contrast connectionism with Newell and Simon’s conception of “physical symbol systems”. This conception finds its philosophical counterpart in the theories of Chomsky (regarding syntax

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https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48661-5s a human being, of course, I have also had to personally cope with experiences in life that have involved formal systems and syntax processing. Sometimes our professional activities become detached from our life experiences to a degree that might astonish empirical scientists. Our enthusiasm for a

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Lecture Notes in Computer Scienceton and Perlis [.], contend this suggestion is mistaken because it rests upon a misconception. Their position emphasizes the crucial role of social processes in coming to accept the validity of a proof or the truth of a theorem, no matter whether within purely mathematical contexts or without: “We b

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https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48661-5of the discipline. There are those, such as C. A. R. Hoare and Edsgar Dijkstra, who maintain that, in order to attain the standing of a science rather than of a craft, computer science should model itself after mathematics. Others, including Richard DeMillo, Richard Lipton, and Alan Perlis, however,

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