Titlebook: Collective Decision Making; Views from Social Ch Adrian Van Deemen,Agnieszka Rusinowska Book 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010 Al

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書目名稱Collective Decision Making讀者反饋




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opalescence

The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists,of the available candidates. Several complications can then arise during the implementation of many voting rules in the presence of such voter indifference. One possible option that can be used to avoid these types of complications is to require that all voters must arbitrarily break any such indiff

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Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models, losing side over a majority of the issues). By doing so, answers to longstanding concerns are obtained; e.g., Kelly conjectured that an Ostrogorski paradox ensures that no candidate can be a Condorcet winner; we prove this is true for any number of issues and establish a connection with McKelvey’s

Infinitesimal

材料等

Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making,icult to interpret. By using a constructive method, we investigate which preference configurations are excluded by ER from the domain of majority decisions and which configurations are included. This exclusion-inclusion analysis results in an enumeration of all maximal lists of weak orderings over a

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Rights Revisited, and Limited, introduced the notion of limited rights both in an aggregation function framework and in a social choice function framework. He then proved Sen-type impossibility theorems. In the aggregation function framework an individual has a “right” if whenever she prefers an option (social state), say ., to

是他笨

Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes,cision making process. First, we establish the conditions under which we can be sure that there is at least one member who can thus be held responsible. Formulated differently, we examine the conditions that ensure the absence of “responsibility voids”. Next we focus on the circumstances in which mo

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Making (Non-standard) Choices,ealed preference. The choices that we discuss and describe axiomatically are, among others, the rational shortlist method which is a two-stage procedure, the choice of the second largest option as the best element, the choice of the median object and choices according to an attention ordering. The v

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