Titlebook: Cold-War Propaganda in the 1950s; Gary D. Rawnsley (Lecturer in Politics) Book 1999 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8119-6y had also found it most difficult to utilize and dangerously subtle and complex. Thus they, and in particular Stalin, came to believe that cinema must be kept simple in content and under tight control. This suspicious approach to the medium was to be the most important factor in the development of

Oversee

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8119-6 fill a gap in film historiography, but also to shed further light on the debate concerning the development of a Cold War consensus in Britain in the decade after the Second World War. As part of this, the essay explores the principal Cold War themes addressed by the films, the motives that lay behi

ARENA

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8119-6rises, but admit to welcoming the opportunities which crises bring.’. He later described the period of the General Strike as one of ‘unprecedented strain’, but was relieved his fear that BBC ‘prestige and tradition’ might suffer had been proved groundless.. Reith could well have been anticipating ev

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gregarious

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8119-6 a campaign of propaganda, subversion and military force organized and managed by the United States. The propaganda campaign, an important component of the overall programme, was sophisticated and wide-ranging, extending beyond the United States to Guatemala, other Latin American states and America’

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8119-6uired. Containment had called for the American political establishment to accept a degree of passivity in its foreign policy, reflected in Senator Wiley’s description of the strategy as ‘pantywaist diplomacy’.. Other denunciations of containment were much more forceful but no less colourful. Congres

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