Titlebook: Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics; Proceedings of the I William L. Harper,Brian Skyrms Conference proceedings 1988 Kluwe

隨意

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-08836-3ept of belief itself, the concept of subjective probability, and, presumably the most important, the concept of a reason in the sense of a theoretical reason for believing something. Covertly epistemological notions are much more difficult to understand; maybe, they are not epistemological at all. H

Palliation

,Der objektorientierte Entwicklungsproze?,tosses may be described correctly (a) as a half million cases of landing heads among a million cases of landing heads or tails, (b) as approximately a half million cases of landing heads (or as between 490000 and 510000 cases of landing heads) among a million cases of landing heads or tails; and (c)

vitrectomy

Debate

heartburn

Inculcate

Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utilitytheory (.-expectation, or causal expected utility, decision theory). The foundation has the following two virtues: first, it puts the theory on an equal footing with competitors for which foundations have already been given; second, this foundation will provide the basis for a reply to the most seri

defibrillator

后退

Consistency and Decision: Variations on Ramseyan Themesth in the final two sections of “Truth and Probability.” Ramsey’s comments on this subject were very unsystematic, but I think that they advance considerations of fundamental importance which appear to have been overlooked by his followers. I may add that in Chapter III of Adams, 1975, I attempted t

Expostulate

Powers to look closely at the role of causal principles in classical mechanics. The other concerns the role of causal relations in analysing choice under certainty, where the uncertainty may appear to be of two sorts — causal uncertainty, or epistemic uncertainty. The latter sort of problem has attracted

indifferent