Titlebook: Business, Government and Economic Institutions in China; Xiaoke Zhang,Tianbiao Zhu Book 2018 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(

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978-3-319-87803-4The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

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神化怪物

Mehrpersonen-Preisdifferenzierungid-2000s, and the ensuing changes in government–MNC relations that emerged henceforth in the automotive sector. The central argument is that, in China, the automotive industry witnessed dramatic changes in the governance pattern?of government–MNCs relations that enabled more full use of the capital,

Gesture

Mehrpersonen-Preisdifferenzierungen associational practices and patterns of economic development. In Wuxi, business associations are organized and run by government in a top-down approach, and serve as state corporatist instruments; while in Wenzhou, there emerged many grass-roots business associations initiated and governed by ent

Orthodontics

D. G?ritz,F. H. Müller,W. Sietzt the under-institutionalized taxation institution plays an important role in making the local state–business relationships more collusive than collaborative in China. The taxation administration is under-institutionalized; it imposes high nominal tax rates, gives tax officers broad discretional pow

牌帶來(lái)

M. Dettenmaier,S. Fischer,E. W. Fischerese private entrepreneurs are distributed across industrial sectors and geographical regions in China. Based on the survey data of Chinese private enterprises from 2000 to 2012, we use the annual average ratio of private entrepreneurs who are members of People’s Congress (PC) and/or Chinese People’s

令人發(fā)膩

Nasennebenh?hlen und Gesichtssch?delto the European international system in the mid-nineteenth century, the motive of survival and competition has gradually come to dominate the political practices of the Chinese elites, and this is especially the case after 1949 when an autonomous state was finally created. Furthermore, a particular

Compass

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-35997-5ting from a firm’s owners. China’s companies have followed two divergent corporate governance reform trajectories, corresponding to two models of business–government relations: the Guangdong model and the Shanghai model. In the Guangdong model, the local government maintains weaker ties to Beijing,

Invertebrate

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9993-1in government–business relations. It then discusses the government restructuring and economic downturn stemming from the 2008 global financial crisis onward as internal and external sources of emerging statist policy ideas, respectively. Institutionally, the changing balance of power in the state st