Titlebook: Britain and Decolonisation; The Retreat from Emp John Darwin Textbook 1988Latest edition Macmillan Publishers Limited 1988 conflict.Falklan

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替代品

,War and Empire, 1939–45,India and the other dependencies where no bond of racial solidarity united mother-country and colonial population, governments in Britain, even before 1914, viewed the prospect of any war that might extend beyond Europe with doubt and gloom. In the heyday of empire, British strategists anxiously deb

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CODA

Winds of Change,power whose remaining overseas possessions were more of an embarrassment than a source of strength, trade or influence; and a power whose economic performance placed her at best somewhere below the top of the second division. In this second and decisive period of readjustment, almost all the remaini

撫慰

Conclusion,ces (however important) in the large and complicated jigsaw puzzle of British interests and commitments. Historically, too, British policy had declined to treat this ‘formal’ empire with special consideration, or to regard it as of intrinsically greater value than regions that were dominated ‘inform

fatty-acids

Ivar Bleiklie,Jürgen Enders,Benedetto Leporit of semi-colonies or ‘informal empire’ where states that remained technically independent enjoyed so little economic and political freedom as to be almost in the position of a colony. The independence of most of North and South America from metropolitan control by 1830 modified this picture, but no

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2410-3iary activities to be maintained once the main base in Asia was lost? More to the point, perhaps, was it not clear by 1948 that the days of colonial empire were numbered? If the British could not summon the power or the will to hold India what would they be able to hold? What indeed would be worth h

Acetaldehyde

Disaster Studies and Managementt an end. By the end of the 1950s, it might be argued, it merely remained for the British to acknowledge formally their reduced international circumstances, to complete the technical operations required to transfer sovereignty to the colonial peoples and wind up their empire.