Titlebook: Autonomy and the Self; Michael Kühler,Nadja Jelinek Book 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Autonomy.Commitment Philosoph

Delirium

detach

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1409-1n this possibility and to make room for the idea of requiring oneself to do at least the best one can in light of one’s unrealizable ideals, it is argued that the assumption of “ought” conceptually implying “can” has to be rejected and replaced by a more complex and genuinely normative assessment of

LUDE

Conclusions and Considerations,easons can be both normatively and motivationally binding on the child even though she may not yet be in a position to understand them. That such reasons are essentially interpersonal seems to make otiose whether they are “internal” or “external,” thereby rendering that distinction less important th

watertight,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1409-1reciate the motives that lie behind what we do. A sense of self is thus crucial to our status as agents; without a sense of self, we have no reason to place faith in our own agency—in our ability to affect the world through our choices and actions and our position to do so.

V洗浴

愛(ài)社交

Alex Stagnaro-Green M.D., M.H.P.E.self-constituting narratives are opposed by some other and perhaps even more powerful yet discriminating narratives. These master-narratives, despite their often asserted socially integrating function, then prove to be harmful to these persons, diminishing their chances of equal social and political

Pelvic-Floor

geometrician

Freedom Without Choice?on as well as freedom of will, the answer is then mostly negative. Apart from cases like theoretical rationality or language, all cases of personal freedom mattering most for personal autonomy rely on the first criterion as well, i.e. the agent has to be able to choose between different alternatives

ingrate

Freedom and Normativity – Varieties of Free Wille notion of free will. The paper then argues for an evaluative and substantive approach regarding those aspects of freedom of the will which matter in our practical disputes and a number of these aspects are discussed in detail, thereby presenting a complex account of what is (really) at stake in di

Engaging

Norm-Guided Formation of Cares Without Volitional Necessity – A Response to Frankfurtn of new cares (b) without already motivating the agent by connection to natural desires or standing commitments (as Humean versions of reasons-internalism require). Put positively, as Kant and Kierkegaard held, human beings form “selves” or practical identities by way of “projective motivation” – a