Titlebook: Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; AAMAS 2016 Workshops Nardine Osman,Carles Sierra Conference proceedings 2016 Springer Internation

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Using Stackelberg Games to Model Electric Power Grid Investments in Renewable Energy Settings,generators as a Stackelberg game and determine the generation capacity and profits at equilibrium. Finally, we examine a UK-based network upgrade case-study and show how results can be utilised to set a grid access payment mechanism, ensuring both the implementation of transmission and local generation investments.

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Joe Lorkowski,Vladik KreinovichThus, by faithfully pursuing a commitment, an agent can be trusted to make sequential decisions that it believes can cause an intended state to arise. In general, though, an agent’s actions will have uncertain outcomes, and thus reaching an intended state cannot be guaranteed. For such sequential de

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Intelligent Systems Reference Libraryms problem. Some degree of fault-tolerance in such teams is often required which enables the team to continue to complete all tasks even if a subset of the agents are incapacitated. A .-robust team is one that is capable of completing all assigned tasks when any . team members are not available. The

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Alfredo Petrosino,Alessio Feroneobjective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of . on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to . mechanisms. We show

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