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Titlebook: Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications; First International Sanmay Das,Michael Ostrovsky,Boleslaw Szymanksi Conference proceed

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 19:37:05 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
期刊全稱(chēng)Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications
期刊簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)First International
影響因子2023Sanmay Das,Michael Ostrovsky,Boleslaw Szymanksi
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/165/164956/164956.mp4
學(xué)科分類(lèi)Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engi
圖書(shū)封面Titlebook: Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications; First International Sanmay Das,Michael Ostrovsky,Boleslaw Szymanksi Conference proceed
影響因子These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction marke
Pindex Conference proceedings 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-0382-8 by AFPs (since they bear most of the risk) or efforts to block disability claims. Since the price of this insurance is hidden in the fees charged by AFPs for the administration of individual accounts and pension funds there was lack of price transparency. Since new AFPs have no history of members’
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ATN — Steuerung Durch Kasusrahmenr aggregate belief over time. This gives us the precise moments in conversations where the target’s response caused a significant shift in the aggregate belief, indicating that the response was decidedly human or unhuman. An additional benefit is that (we believe) the game is more enjoyable to parti
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Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions,e same properties for general valuations. In many situations, however, one cannot assume bidders to bid straightforward and it is not clear from the theory how these non-linear personalized price auctions (NLPPAs) perform in this case. Robustness of auctions with respect to different bidding behavio
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Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market,r aggregate belief over time. This gives us the precise moments in conversations where the target’s response caused a significant shift in the aggregate belief, indicating that the response was decidedly human or unhuman. An additional benefit is that (we believe) the game is more enjoyable to parti
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A Market-Based Approach to Multi-factory Scheduling,nformation and their own preferences. Using a simple (zero-intelligence) bidding strategy, we empirically demonstrate that our market-based approach achieves a lower bound efficiency of 84%. This represents a trade-off between a reasonable level of efficiency (compared to a centralised approach) and
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