Titlebook: Auction Theory; Introductory Exercis Pak-Sing Choi,Felix Munoz-Garcia Textbook 2021 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under

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Textbook 2021ook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. A

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Introducing graphical representationion, but they have imprecise and potentially different signals of the amount of oil barrels in the reservoir (as they receive different engineering reports) and, as a consequence, hold different estimates of the oil lease’s profitability.

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Second-Price Auctions,econd-highest bid. This auction format is relatively easy to analyze, requiring limited mathematical steps, and thus we believe that it can serve as a first approximation to bidding behavior for non-technical readers. Examples of this auction format include eBay sales, auctioning radio spectrums, an

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All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders,bmitting the highest bid wins the object. However, as opposed to other auctions where only the winning bidder must pay for the object (either the highest or second-highest bid), in the all-pay auction . must pay the bid that he submitted. As expected, this makes bidders less aggressive in their bids

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Third-Price Auctions, ,th-Price Auctions, and Lotteries,mplies that in the first-price auction, we have that .?=?1, as the winning bidder pays the highest bid; and in the second-price auction, .?=?2, as he pays the second-highest bid. A similar argument applies to the third-price auction, where .?=?3, as the winning bidder pays the third-highest bid, and

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Common-Value Auctions,ct’s true valuation. Instead, every bidder privately observes a noisy signal about the object’s value and, based on this signal, submits a bid. This model is typically used to analyze the auctioning of oil leases, as firms exploiting the oil reservoir would earn a similar profit if they win the auct

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