Titlebook: Artificial Economics; Agent-Based Methods M. Beckmann,H. P. Künzi,Olivier Brandouy Conference proceedings 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heid

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書目名稱Artificial Economics影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Artificial Economics影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Artificial Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Artificial Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Artificial Economics被引頻次




書目名稱Artificial Economics被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Artificial Economics年度引用




書目名稱Artificial Economics年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Artificial Economics讀者反饋




書目名稱Artificial Economics讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

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哀求

Pitfalls in Experimental Economics process. It was shown by Arthur and LeBaron, with the help of computer experiments, that agents in bounded rationality can make a rational global behavior emerge in this context. In the original model, agents do not ground their decision on an economic logic. Hence, we modify indicators used by age

ENACT

Pitfalls in Experimental Economicsonly relative to an institutional environment. Thus for a given environment, the Continuous Double Action (CDA) market, we examine the performance of alternative . agents, in terms of market efficiency and individual surplus..In CDA markets traders face three non-trivial decisions: How much should t

Irrepressible

DEI

Adriaan W. C. Dorresteijn,Bernhard Kluges), and the length of the delay in shipping between firms (one or three weeks) are controlled and compared in the multiagent simulations. We found a counterexample for bullwhip effect such that inventory level of upstream firm was not always larger than that of downstream firm. In addition, contrary

ARENA

Preparation of the Early Squid Blastodermif men propose, it produces stable matching which is the best for men and the worst for women, and vise versa. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm with compromise that produce the balanced matching which are almost optimal for both sides. It is an important issue how far agents seek their own

攤位

Experimental Embryology of Gymnosperms,f the investment decision of a single “representative” agent. We consider a two-asset pure exchange economy populated by CRRA traders whose individual demands are functions of the past market history. If individual choices are expressed as noisy versions of a common behavior, and the number of agent

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