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Titlebook: Applied Game Theory; Proceedings of a Con S. J. Brams,A. Schotter,G. Schw?diauer Conference proceedings 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelb

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期刊全稱Applied Game Theory
期刊簡稱Proceedings of a Con
影響因子2023S. J. Brams,A. Schotter,G. Schw?diauer
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/160/159824/159824.mp4
圖書封面Titlebook: Applied Game Theory; Proceedings of a Con S. J. Brams,A. Schotter,G. Schw?diauer Conference proceedings 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelb
Pindex Conference proceedings 1979
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板凳
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Christine Markarian,Abdul Nasser El-Kassared and yet his percentage of the voting power increased when power is measured by either the Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik power index. This type of result is proven to be inevitable for . ≥ 6 in the Banzhaf case and . ≥ 7 in the Shapley-Shubik case..Finally, this result is illustrated by observing the
地板
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 07:37:45 | 只看該作者
Murali Thiyagarajah,B. John Oommen’ standards were well within the prediction of the bargaining set; one quartet supported the power model. Analysis of the patterns of coalition structure and rudimentary analyses of the bargaining processes indicate that the central concept of standards of fairness underlying the power model is appr
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 08:54:04 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6applied mathematics; computation; computer science; economics; game theory; mathematics; theory; Vienna
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On Persistent Implications of?E2E Testinglows: the amount of power of . over . is related to the level of achievement of .’s objectives in the interaction .. As for the origin of power, it is taken as related to the strategies available to both parties in their interaction (such as rewards, punishments, etc.)..The development of these idea
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 01:17:59 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08965-7et of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coal
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 04:44:50 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08965-7hich can be modelled as simple games. The properties of the Banzhaf, Coleman, and Shapley/Shubik indices of power have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere. The properties of the first two are compared in detail with the properties of two measures of satisfaction, the Zipke index defined here and a m
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 08:57:06 | 只看該作者
Christine Markarian,Abdul Nasser El-Kassar that arises, however, is how bad a proxy are they?.In other words, if we were to increase (or decrease) a voter’s voting weight within a voting body, would his resulting power within the organization always increase (or decrease), but possible not in proportion to the increase in his weight, or cou
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