Titlebook: Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector; Equilibrium Methods Yihsu Chen,Afzal S. Siddiqui,Makoto Tanaka Book 2020 Springer Na

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Isabelle Gauger,Tobias Nagel,Marco Hubers in the power sector. While a central planner who internalizes GHG emissions?via a Pigouvian tax?to curb consumption may yield a first-best policy, decentralized mechanisms are typically deployed in OECD?countries’ power sectors in order to align the incentives of private power companies with those

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sterilization

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34111-4we discuss the model of Stackelberg leader–follower oligopoly in the context of electricity markets. The structure of a Stackelberg leader firm with other follower firms that behave à la Cournot is represented by a bi-level problem. It is then recast as a mathematical program with equilibrium constr

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Thorsten Reckelkamm,Jochen Deusetor (TSO), whereas generation expansion and operations are carried out by profit-maximizing power companies. Thus, a credible assessment of policy proposals requires a suitable framework that models this distinction between decision makers’ motives directly. Toward that end, we propose a bi-level mo

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Isabelle Gauger,Tobias Nagel,Marco Huberincentives in mitigation of GHG emissions?since consumption is not curbed to the same extent as under the first-best policy. Consequently, “too much” renewable energy (RE)?investment takes place. This distortion is less pronounced when power companies behave à la Cournot because the exercise of mark

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