Titlebook: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind; Souls, Science and H David Cockburn Book 2001 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publis

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76620-6demon — is that at which he turns to his knowledge of his own existence and of the contents of his own mind. He suggests that in his conviction that he is ‘thinking’, and that he exists, he encounters certainties about which there is no possibility that he could be mistaken.

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Mind and Behaviour,rtesian understanding of a person. We might articulate something that is shared by the range of dominant contemporary views in this way: a person is an extended, tangible being that exists in the same world as tables, trees and mountains. But this formulation conceals differences that are every bit

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Mental Causation, Supervenience and Physicalism,ght takes it for granted that they do. For example, that oak tree would still be standing had it not been for the fact that Jones wanted to improve the view from his study and so chopped it down. The suggestion that the tree would have come down anyway, whether or not Jones had wanted it to, seems t

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Human Beings,, emotions and sensations, is simply a physical organ of the body — namely, the brain. Now as I stressed, to knock down an argument for the mind-brain identity thesis is not itself to knock down the mind-brain identity thesis; still less is it to knock down the other varieties of physicalism that ar