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of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian opinion in both the Congress, and the public at large, and his recognition of the United States’ global interests. That the shape of FDR’s ultimate vision for the post-1945 world blended the key assumptions and insights of the two extroverted political cultures of stat

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gy adjustment during the Cold War. These debates were from 1945 onward ultimately about the means and not the ends of American grand strategy and demonstrated the manner in which the political cultures of statecraft acted as permissive filters to make certain strategic choices more likely than other

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bal inequality as key drivers of international politics. Ronald Reagan’s approach to American grand strategy, in turn, was a reaction to the perceived errors of détente and the failure of the Carter administration to harness its quest for a moral foreign policy to the pursuit of American strategic a

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Power, Ideas, and Choice: Explaining Change in American Grand Strategy,s. I define these political cultures of statecraft following Walter Russell Mead’s typology of Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian and argue that each presents a “historical repertoire” that provides multiple narratives for leaders or strategists to draw upon to guide particular gra

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Primacy Unrequited: American Grand Strategy Under Wilson,ot be based on an alliance of some states against others but rather on American leadership of a “universal cooperative” effort to preserve order. Wilson’s solution to insecurity of international politics was thus distinctly primacist in nature as it sought to overcome the “evils” of traditional grea