Titlebook: Algorithms -- ESA 2010, Part II; 18th Annual European Mark Berg,Ulrich Meyer Conference proceedings 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

Pierce

書(shū)目名稱Algorithms -- ESA 2010, Part II影響因子(影響力)




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LIEN

污穢

Weitere Entwicklung der Massenbetontechnik,ribution of the individual input elements to the output size. To obtain nearly optimal algorithms for these problems, we introduce a parallel distribution sweeping technique inspired by its sequential counterpart.

conscience

Eviction

obsolete

細(xì)胞學(xué)

Top-, Ranked Document Search in General Text Databasesd in this paper. Our best approach is significantly faster than existing methods in RAM, and is even three times faster than a state-of-the-art inverted file implementation for English text when word queries are issued.

Nmda-Receptor

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-2358-4rst . truthful auctions which indeed provide essentially the best possible approximation guarantees achievable by any polynomial-time algorithm. This shows that deterministic truthful auctions have the same power as randomized ones if the bidders withdraw from unrealistic lies.

悲痛

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-30696-0 (some of which arise in kidney exchanges and online dating, and others arise in modeling online advertisements); we give LP-rounding based constant-factor approximation algorithms for these problems. Our main results are:

GUILT

Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractablerst . truthful auctions which indeed provide essentially the best possible approximation guarantees achievable by any polynomial-time algorithm. This shows that deterministic truthful auctions have the same power as randomized ones if the bidders withdraw from unrealistic lies.