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Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 14th International S Ioannis Caragiannis,Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen Conference proceedings 2021 Springer Nature Sw

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樓主: 討論小組
21#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 06:54:39 | 只看該作者
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programmingr’s valuation is drawn from a regular distribution . and that the seller has access to . independently drawn samples from .. By solving a family of mixed-integer linear programs (MILPs), the ERM mechanism is proven to guarantee at least .5914 times the optimal revenue in expectation. Using solutions
22#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 10:37:10 | 只看該作者
23#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 13:00:30 | 只看該作者
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximationet al.?recently established that if bidders’ valuation functions are submodular over their signals (a.k.a.?SOS), a truthful 4-approximation to the optimal welfare exists. We show existence of a mechanism that is truthful and achieves a tight 2-approximation to the optimal welfare when signals are bi
24#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 18:23:04 | 只看該作者
25#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 19:57:50 | 只看該作者
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Valuese one of . different values, and her value for the good is a weakly increasing function of all the bidders’ signals. The bidders are partitioned into . expertise-groups, based on how their signal can impact the values for the good, and we prove upper and lower bounds regarding the approximability of
26#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 03:20:22 | 只看該作者
27#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 06:43:29 | 只看該作者
On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium and 0.36, finally the best approximate ratio of 0.3393 by Tsaknakis and Spirakis?(TS algorithm for short). Efforts to improve the results remain not successful in the past 14 years..This work makes the first progress to show that the bound of 0.3393 is indeed tight for the TS algorithm. Next, we ch
28#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 10:09:10 | 只看該作者
29#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 14:57:24 | 只看該作者
Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Gamesto the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit .-approximate pure Nash equilibria for certain settings of . and .. They left open, however, the question of how hard it is to find such an equilibrium. In this work, we develop a query-efficient reduction from more general games
30#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 18:56:58 | 只看該作者
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