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Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 4th International Sy Giuseppe Persiano Conference proceedings 2011 Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2011 app

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41#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 16:25:21 | 只看該作者
A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computingunction that specifies willingness to pay as a function of job due dates. The cloud provider in response allocates a subset of these jobs, taking into advantage the . of allocating resources to jobs in the cloud environment. Focusing on social-welfare as the system objective (especially relevant for
42#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 19:37:52 | 只看該作者
43#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 23:03:56 | 只看該作者
Complexity of Rational and Irrational Nash Equilibriac games. These problems ask, given a strategic game, whether or not it admits . a . Nash equilibrium where all probabilities are rational numbers, and . an . Nash equilibrium where at least one probability is irrational, respectively. We are interested here in the complexities of ?. and ?...Towards
44#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 03:26:58 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8of the buyers, to a solution equivalent to the minimum revenue equilibrium under the true preferences of buyers, which in turn is revenue equivalent to a VCG solution..We will also discuss other related issues as well as open problems.
45#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 10:51:24 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8hanism is a crucial requirement for our algorithm, since it allows a payment process without any redundant relation between an auctioneer and players. An inability to resolve this problem could even prevent the application of such mechanisms in a real marketing process. We design a 6-approximation p
46#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 13:50:35 | 只看該作者
Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis,the last ad impression. In this paper, we observe how the current method of attribution leads to inefficiency in the allocation mechanism. We develop a fairly general model to capture how a sequence of impressions can lead to a conversion, and solve the optimal ad allocation problem in this model. W
47#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 18:52:10 | 只看該作者
Antifaschistische Organisation der PDS, called ., which include the 2.-price Vickrey auction, there . exists a dissection protocol that provides a . for uniform or “almost uniform” probability distributions over inputs. To establish this result we present an interesting connection between the approximate privacy framework and basic conce
48#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 20:58:32 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8roduced there. While the proposed policy achieves the best possible price of anarchy with respect to a pure NE, the game induced by the proposed policy may admit no pure NE, thus the . measure reflects the worst case inefficiency better. We show that the dynamic inefficiency may be arbitrarily highe
49#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 01:35:18 | 只看該作者
Antifaschistische Strategic der PDS, it can be done in polynomial time. In addition the problem is shown to be APX-hard, since its restriction to graphs admitting a vertex cover is equivalent, from the approximability point of view, to . in general graphs.
50#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 07:32:37 | 只看該作者
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