Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 4th International Sy Giuseppe Persiano Conference proceedings 2011 Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2011 app

鏟除

書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

消滅

inscribe

Stressfaktor #10: Planung & Kontrolle,We first provide a quick background in Game and Economic Theory, and then discuss some fundamental computational questions arising in these areas. We will focus on the interplay between Game Theory and Computer Science, with an emphasis on some of the most challenging open questions.

炸壞

Computational Game TheoryWe first provide a quick background in Game and Economic Theory, and then discuss some fundamental computational questions arising in these areas. We will focus on the interplay between Game Theory and Computer Science, with an emphasis on some of the most challenging open questions.

內(nèi)行

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8ces are used to determine allocations of indivisible items under the principles of individual optimization and market clearance, based on public knowledge of individual preferences. Alternatively, auction mechanisms have been used with a different set of principles for the determination of prices, b

AMOR

Antifaschistische Ideologic der PDS,. Our abstraction has multiple agents biding repeatedly for multiple identical items (such as impressions in an ad auction). The agents are budget limited and have a value for per item. We abstract the repeated interaction as a one-shot game, which we call ., where agents submit a bid and a budget,

先鋒派

饒舌的人

Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis, recently to the pay-per-conversion model. Such models require the ad allocation engine to translate the advertiser’s value per click/conversion to value per impression. This is often done through simple models that assume that each impression of the ad stochastically leads to a click/conversion ind

薄膜

Antifaschistische Organisation der PDS, goal, which has, thus far, received significantly less attention, is to ., ., to ensure that bidders reveal no more information than necessary. We further investigate and generalize the approximate privacy model for two-party communication recently introduced by Feigenbaum .?[8]. We explore the pri

吸氣

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8 the ratio between the optimal outcome and the worst Nash equilibrium. However, this notion is well defined only for games that always possess a Nash equilibrium (NE). We propose the . measure, which is roughly defined as the average inefficiency in an infinite best-response dynamic. Both the price