Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 12th International S Dimitris Fotakis,Evangelos Markakis Conference proceedings 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland A

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The Declining Price Anomaly Is Not Universal in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions (But Almost Is)en observed in a plethora of practical applications. On the theoretical side, Gale and Stegeman?[.] proved that the anomaly is guaranteed to hold in full information sequential auctions with exactly two buyers. We prove that the declining price anomaly is . guaranteed in full information sequential

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Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctionse (subadditive) bidder can guarantee in an auction against individually rational bidders? Suppose there are . bidders and . is the value bidder . has for the entire set of items. We study the above problem from the perspective of the first bidder, Bidder?1. In this setting, the worst case profit gua

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The Online Best Reply Algorithm for Resource Allocation Problemsn problem, we are given a set of resources and a set of requests that arrive in an online manner. Each request consists of a set of feasible allocations and an allocation is a set of resources. The total cost of an allocation vector is given by the sum of the resources’ costs, where each resource’s

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Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-030-30473-7Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349