Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; Second International Marios Mavronicolas,Vicky G. Papadopoulou Conference proceedings 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin

Minatory

OPINE

Was ist zu tun: Interventionen,ombination of agents’ actions, which are not directly observable by the principal. In [1] we suggest and study a basic “combinatorial agency” model for this setting. In this paper we expose a somewhat surprising phenomenon found in this setting: cases where the principal can gain by asking agents to

pester

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68327-8ubgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable..In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external payments. We consider a scenario where an external party, wh

新義

厚顏

Was wir nicht wissen: offene Fragen,ation in online auctions, where an auctioneer is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. The auctioneer has the full knowledge of bidders’ private valuations for the items and tries to maximize his profit. Compared with the profit of fixed price schemes, the competi

Radiculopathy

Was wir nicht wissen: offene Fragen,ring stable matchings with socially optimal ones, as well as studying the convergence of various natural algorithms to stable matchings. Our main goal is to design mechanisms that incentivize agents to participate in matchings that are socially desirable. We show that theoretically, the loss in soci

cipher

Was ist zu tun: Interventionen, to its destination as soon as possible. Such flows have been well studied in time-invariant networks in the last few years. A key observation that must be taken into account in defining and studying selfish flow, however, is that a flow can take a non-negligible amount of time to travel across the

Inexorable

Was wir nicht wissen: offene Fragen,ts from the queues of these routers so that network endpoints will be inclined to share router capacity fairly and minimize the overflow of packets trying to enter the queues. We study just how effective some of these queuing policies are when each network endpoint is a self-interested player with n

Cubicle

Basal-Ganglia

Der Blick voraus: Verlauf und Prognose,l, players attempt to connect to a common source node in a network by purchasing edges, and sharing their costs with other players. We introduce the . version of this game, where each player desires 2 edge-disjoint connections between her pair of nodes instead of just a single connecting path, and a