Titlebook: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms; AAMAS 2005 Workshop, Han Poutré,Norman M. Sadeh,Sverker Janson

exigent

https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137008565objects that are exclusively either common value or private value. However, in many real-world cases an object has both features. Also, in such cases, the common value depends on how much each bidder values the object. Moreover, a bidder generally does not know the true common value (since it may no

注意

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55968-6arious solutions exist for solving this problem but they are all centralized. That is, they assume that all bids are sent to a centralized auctioneer who then determines the winning set of bids. In this paper we introduce the problem of distributed winner determination in combinatorial auctions whic

哎呦

https://doi.org/10.3920/978-90-8686-720-2e on the efficiency of market-based allocation. Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding. These benefits are highly sensitive to the form of price quote p

船員

https://doi.org/10.3920/978-90-8686-720-2rested agents. VCG mechanisms have received wide attention in the AI community because they are efficient and strategy-proof; a special case of the Groves family of mechanisms, VCG mechanisms are the . direct-revelation mechanisms that are allocatively efficient and strategy-proof. Unfortunately, VC

兇兆

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7984-6 unique solution, there is an element of uncertainty associated with this value. This uncertainty in the solution of a game provides an additional dimension for evaluating a player’s prospects of playing the game. Thus, players want to know not only their Shapley value for a game, but also the assoc

作繭自縛

正面

露天歷史劇

Patrick Cahoon,Carol Haigh,Tony Sumnerer we present the Socrates trading agent and the strategies that were developed for and used in the TAC Supply Chain Management game as part of the 2004 competition. The resulting behaviour and performance in the TAC competition as well as in a series of controlled experiments are discussed.

alcoholism

Breathe Easy: Digital Stories About COPDon (TAC SCM). In particular, we focus on the way in which our agent sets its prices according to the prevailing market situation and its own inventory level (because this adaptivity and flexibility are the key components of its success). Specifically, we analyse our pricing model’s performance both

mortgage

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64146-1meter values. Our empirical game-theoretic analysis is facilitated by approximating games through hierarchical reduction methods. This approach generated a small set of candidates for the version to run in the TAC-05 tournament. We selected among these based on performance in preliminary rounds, ult