Titlebook: Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility; Andrei Buckareff,Carlos Moya,Sergi Rosell Book 2015 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Autho

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Introductiont been impaired, providing that they satisfy other criteria when they act, as responsible agents. And most regard the potential status of human agents as responsible agents as sufficient to make them the possible candidates of ascriptions of moral blame and praise for how they conduct themselves.

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Classical Compatibilism and Temporal Ontologysions of contemporary compatibilism are not tenable under the assumption of an eternalist conception of time: the eternalist’s idea that our future decisions and actions exist and are as real as presently existing events is thought to be incompatible with the openness of the future that freedom seems to require.

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Moral Responsibility Skepticism: Meeting McKenna’s Challenge12) issues a powerful challenge to the skeptic. McKenna argues that blame is non-instrumentally good, or, at minimum, not bad, and suggests that skepticism has been motivated in important part by a confusion between blame and punishment. Punishment may be very severe, but blame need not. In this paper, I reply to McKenna on behalf of the skeptic.

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In Defense of a Challenge to Moral Responsibility Skepticism: A Reply to Levye ambit of justified blame. Second, with one crucial caveat aside, I argued that blame . be justified. And I defended grounds for doing so that appealed both to considerations of basic desert and as well to considerations that can be deployed independently of any commitment to basic desert.

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