| 期刊全稱 | Advances in Mathematical Economics | | 影響因子2023 | Shigeo Kusuoka (Professor),Toru Maruyama (Professo | | 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/149/148804/148804.mp4 | | 學(xué)科分類 | Advances in Mathematical Economics | | 圖書封面 |  | | 影響因子 | The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these is- sues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially reduces the problem to the sole principal‘s (the sole Stackelberg leader‘s) optimization problem subject to the agents‘ (the Stackelberg followers‘) re- sponses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic setups characterized by different relationships among decision-makers. A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete in- formation. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more impor- tantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies. See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formula- tion of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous deter- mination of updated information structures); Ichiishi | | Pindex | Book 2000 |
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