Titlebook: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96; International Confer Ueli Maurer Conference proceedings 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996

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書目名稱Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96被引頻次




書目名稱Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96被引頻次學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96讀者反饋




書目名稱Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT ’96讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

遵循的規(guī)范

https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68339-9Cryptanalysis; Cryptographic Functions; Kommunikationsprotokoll; Kryptoanalyse; Public Key Cryptosystems

CYN

泥土謙卑

nautical

Elizabeth H. Slate,Larry C. ClarkWe present a new method to forge ElGamal signatures if the public parameters of the system are not chosen properly. Since the secret key is hereby not found this attack shows that forging ElGamal signatures is sometimes easier than the underlying discrete logarithm problem.

詞根詞綴法

偽書

Population Models for Hematologic DataAA (ISO 8731-2). Customization of a general MAC forgery attack allows improvements in both cases. For the envelope method, the forgery attack is extended to allow key recovery; for example, a 128-bit key can be recovered using 2. known text-MAC pairs and time plus 2. chosen texts. For MAA, internal

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畸形

Alaattin Erkanli,Refik Soyer,Dalene Stanglty of this system is based on the integer factorization problem, but it is unknown whether breaking the system is equivalent to factoring. In this paper, we present a variant of this cryptosystem for which breaking the system is equivalent to factoring the modulus .. Moreover, we extend the ideas to

Ballad

Agostino Nobile,Chandra R. Bhat,Eric I. Paspublic key encryption scheme where the message blocks are encrypted as roots of a polynomial over ?. and a signature scheme where the signature belonging to a message is a (set of) root(s) of a polynomial having the message blocks as coefficients. These sche- mes can be considered as extensions of R