Titlebook: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2010; 29th Annual Internat Henri Gilbert Conference proceedings 2010 International Association for Crypt

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Psychological Care of Cardiac Patientsase problems on ideal lattices are hard for polynomial-time quantum algorithms. Applications include the first truly practical lattice-based public-key cryptosystem with an efficient security reduction; moreover, many of the other applications of LWE can be made much more efficient through the use o

Obvious

尖牙

Bodh I. Jugdutt,Naranjan S. Dhallad by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [5], and construct a secure obfuscator for it. We follow the security argument by Hohenberger et al. to prove that our proposed obfuscator satisfies a virtual black-box property (VBP), which guarantees that the security of the signature scheme is preserved even when ad

Mangle

Davy Vanhoutte Ph.D.,Stephane Heymansuctions of this primitive based on: (1) bilinear groups, (2) lattices, and (3) quadratic residuosity. As a result of independent interest, we show that an . almost immediately yields an Identity-Based Encryption (.) scheme which is secure against (small) partial leakage of the target identity’s decr

TEM

A Martin Gerdes PhD,Xuejun Wangmputational ability (namely, it lacks the ability to decode certain linear encodings and outputs a limited number of bits per iteration), or its precision (each observed bit is flipped with some probability). While our results apply in general to such leakage classes, in particular, we obtain securi

BABY

A Martin Gerdes PhD,Xuejun Wang the public channel. In addition, the protocol incurs a private communication complexity of ., which, as we also show, is .. By contrast, the best known bounds in both public and private channels were linear. Furthermore, our protocol has an optimal round complexity of (3,2), meaning three rounds, t

FAWN

Multiple

CBC471

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Raymond L. Woosley,Peter J. Schwartz-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. We use the optimal differential characteristics to design the best related-key and chosen key attacks on AES-128 (7 out of 10 rounds), AES-192 (full 12 rounds), byte-Camellia (full 18 rounds) and Khazad (7 and 8 out of 8 rounds). We also show that ciphers FOX