Titlebook: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2009; 29th Annual Internat Shai Halevi Conference proceedings 2009 International Association for Cryptologi

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Cannabinoid-Opioid Interactionsyield a variable-length, keyed hash function .:.Our mode is the first to satisfy the MAC preservation property (1) with birthday security, solving the main open problem of Dodis et al. [7] from Eurocrypt 2008. Combined with the PRF preservation (2), our mode provides a hedge against the case when th

Peak-Bone-Mass

Maria Morena PhD,Patrizia Campolongo PhDes any . of them in . steps. Correspondingly, making?.(.) passes of maximally unbalanced Feistel over an?.-bit string ensures CCA-security to 2. queries. Our results, which employ Markov-chain techniques, enable the construction of a practical and provably-secure blockcipher-based scheme for determi

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20529-3g a ciphertext..Moreover, our schemes can be flexibly extended to the ., allowing us to tolerate very large absolute amount of adversarial leakage ? (potentially many gigabytes of information), . by increasing the size of the secret key and without any other loss of efficiency in communication or co

A精確的

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-8302-1ducts) on discrete-log representations of some group elements. (Recall that (.,...,.) is a representation of . in bases (.,...,.) if ..) A COT protocol for language L allows sender . to encrypt message . “under” statement . so that receiver . gets . only if . holds a witness for membership of . in .

CULP

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Canine and Feline Skin Cytologyation complexity of . group elements. We give both a constant round variant and an .(log.) round variant of our zero-knowledge argument; the latter has a computation complexity of .(./log.) exponentiations for the prover and .(.) multiplications for the verifier making it efficient for the prover an

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41241-2thday attack, enough message pairs that produce the inner near-collision with some specific differences are detected, then the impossible differential attack on 4-round AES to the above mentioned MACs is performed. For ., our attack recovers its internal state, which is an equivalent subkey. For MT-