Titlebook: A World Without Values; Essays on John Macki Richard Joyce,Simon Kirchin Book 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 J.L.Mackie.Met

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Frederic Fredersdorf,Pascale Rouxad our feelings into their objects.” He calls this “objectification.” (One might also call it “projectivism.”) This Chapter examines the role that the thesis of moral objectification plays in Mackie‘s endeavors to establish moral skepticism. I conclude that his well-known skeptical arguments (from r

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Pascale Roux,Gerhild Feuersteinon queerness. He calls the argument from queerness “more important” and “more generally applicable” (1977, p. 38), and then he divides this argument into metaphysical and epistemological parts. I subdivide the metaphysical part further into an argument from internalism and an argument from superveni

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-00521-4proach, the Reasons Approach, and the Constitutivist Approach – are outlined and evaluated. It emerges that though the Constitutivist Approach offers the most promising response to Mackie‘s argument, it is difficult to say whether that response is adequate or not.

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Anwendungsorientierte Wirtschaftsinformatikoral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie‘s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Macki