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Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 13th International C Nikhil R. Devanur,Pinyan Lu Conference proceedings 2017 Springer International Publishing

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 19:06:28 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics
副標(biāo)題13th International C
編輯Nikhil R. Devanur,Pinyan Lu
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/1022/1021694/1021694.mp4
概述Includes supplementary material:
叢書名稱Lecture Notes in Computer Science
圖書封面Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 13th International C Nikhil R. Devanur,Pinyan Lu Conference proceedings 2017 Springer International Publishing
描述.This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2017, held in Bangalore, India, in December 2017.. The 28 full and 6 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 89 submissions. The papers reflect the work of researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics who have joined forces to tackle problems at the intersection of computation, game theory and economics.??.
出版日期Conference proceedings 2017
關(guān)鍵詞game theory; mechanism design; auction; network; pricing; Nash equilibria; incentives; markets; routing; dyna
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5
isbn_softcover978-3-319-71923-8
isbn_ebook978-3-319-71924-5Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
issn_series 0302-9743
copyrightSpringer International Publishing AG 2017
The information of publication is updating

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,Don’t Be Greedy: Leveraging Community Structure to Find High Quality Seed Sets for Influence Maximihe study of network cascades. The majority of existing work on this problem, formally referred to as the ., is designed for submodular cascades. Despite the empirical evidence that many cascades are non-submodular, little work has been done focusing on non-submodular influence maximization..We propo
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Information Retention in Heterogeneous Majority Dynamics,tem also after several rounds of the dynamics. Information retention has been studied for the function that returns the majority of the states in systems in which players have states in . and the system evolves according to the majority dynamics: each player repeatedly updates its state to match the
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The Strategy of Experts for Repeated Predictions,andom variable will be realized. A public prediction gradually converges to the outcome, and an expert has access to a more accurate prediction. We study when the expert should reveal his information, when his reward is based on a proper scoring rule (e.g., is proportional to the change in log-likel
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Shapley Facility Location Games,Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of competition in a variety of scenarios. In a typical facility location game, users/customers/voters are mapped to a metric space representing their preferences, and each player picks a point (facility) in that spac
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Shapley Facility Location Games,Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of competition in a variety of scenarios. In a typical facility location game, users/customers/voters are mapped to a metric space representing their preferences, and each player picks a point (facility) in that spac
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