Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 14th International C George Christodoulou,Tobias Harks Conference proceedings 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland

樸素

A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyeronotone hazard rate condition, then selling items separately or in a grand bundle is still approximately optimal. We give a complementary example showing that no constant approximation simple mechanism is possible if budget . can be interdependent with valuations.

極端的正確性

A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyeronotone hazard rate condition, then selling items separately or in a grand bundle is still approximately optimal. We give a complementary example showing that no constant approximation simple mechanism is possible if budget . can be interdependent with valuations.

left-ventricle

The Communication Complexity of Graphical Games on Grid Graphsium problem, we show that in any protocol, the players in some game must communicate at least . bits in?total, and moreover, every player must communicate at least . bits. We also provide protocols with matching or almost matching upper bounds.

滔滔不絕的人

ellagic-acid

Approximating the Existential Theory of the Realshat we obtain a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) for a fragment of constrained .-ETR. We use our theorem to create several new PTAS and QPTAS algorithms for problems from a variety of fields.

cumulative

Antagonism

一大塊

怒目而視

WAX

Infinite-Duration Poorman-Bidding Games. Such games are central in formal verification since they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. We study . in which the players bid for the right to move the token. Two bidding rules have been defined. In . bidding, in each round, the players simultaneously sub