標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Networks and Groups; Models of Strategic Bhaskar Dutta,Matthew O. Jackson Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 Coalitions.Desi [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: GERD847 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:35
書目名稱Networks and Groups影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Networks and Groups影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Networks and Groups網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書目名稱Networks and Groups網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Networks and Groups被引頻次
書目名稱Networks and Groups被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Networks and Groups年度引用
書目名稱Networks and Groups年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Networks and Groups讀者反饋
書目名稱Networks and Groups讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 開(kāi)始沒(méi)有 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:01 作者: 假裝是我 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:33 作者: 驚奇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:11
Matthew O. Jackson,Asher Wolinskya device, an adversary may exploit side-channel leakages to extract critical information of a model (i.e., its architecture or internal parameters). Different adversarial objectives are possible including a fidelity-based scenario where the architecture and parameters are precisely extracted (.). We作者: rheumatism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:10
Cathleen Johnson,Robert P. Gillesattacks. RP masking is provable secure in the probing model, but this solid theoretical underpinning comes at the cost of a massive increase in execution time. In this paper, we describe software optimization methods to accelerate the low-level arithmetic in the field ., which has a significant impa作者: 手工藝品 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:17
Bhaskar Dutta,Suresh Mutuswamiattacks. RP masking is provable secure in the probing model, but this solid theoretical underpinning comes at the cost of a massive increase in execution time. In this paper, we describe software optimization methods to accelerate the low-level arithmetic in the field ., which has a significant impa作者: 外科醫(yī)生 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:09 作者: –LOUS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:44
Venkatesh Bala,Sanjeev Goyald from sensitive computation and data by placing them in the secure world. In a multi-tenant scenario, such isolation is paramount to protect tenants from each other and is guaranteed by partitioning resources (memory, peripherals, etc.) between the tenants. Several third-party defence mechanisms ad作者: 把手 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:43 作者: 感情 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:00 作者: Arroyo 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:50 作者: cuticle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:10 作者: ABOUT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:23
Sergio Currarini,Massimo Morelliteen revisions since the JavaCard API specification was first published more than two decades ago, uptake of newly added features, cryptographic algorithms or their parameterizations, and systematic analysis of overall activity is missing. We fill this gap by mapping the activity of the JavaCard eco作者: 提煉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:13 作者: Project 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:26 作者: 頌揚(yáng)本人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:48
Alison Wattsm. The study of white-box security was revamped by recent advances involving grey box attacks. Since then, many authors have struggled to protect implementations against such new attacks. New designs as well as new security notions appeared, and white-box research in general seems to have greatly be作者: conceal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:43
Rachel E. Kranton,Deborah F. Minehartm. The study of white-box security was revamped by recent advances involving grey box attacks. Since then, many authors have struggled to protect implementations against such new attacks. New designs as well as new security notions appeared, and white-box research in general seems to have greatly be作者: 慢慢沖刷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:41 作者: antedate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:19
Francis Bloch,Sayantan Ghosalquantum cryptography standardization process. It is well known from classical cryptography that actual implementations of cryptographic schemes can be attacked by exploiting side-channels, e.g. timing behavior, power consumption or emanation in the electromagnetic field. Although several of the refe作者: HEED 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:15 作者: folliculitis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:29
Graphs and Cooperation in Games,re, are studied for games in characteristic function form. Fair allocation rules are defined, and these are proven to be unique, closely related to the Shapley value, and stable for a wide class of games.作者: Cabinet 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:44 作者: 珊瑚 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:17 作者: Antagonism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:35
Stable Networks,ous value function gives the value of each network, while an allocation rule describes how the value is distributed amongst the agents. M. Jackson and A. Wolinsky (1996, .., 44–74) have recently demonstrated a potential conflict between stability and efficiency in this framework. In this paper, we u作者: BLOT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:59 作者: 輕彈 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:35
A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation,rming and maintaining links against the potential rewards from doing so. We suppose that a link with another agent allows access, in part and in due course, to the benefits available to the latter via his own links. Thus individual links generate externalities whose value depends on the level of dec作者: 動(dòng)機(jī) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:27 作者: Misgiving 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:01
Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Valu “predict” (or assume) that the all-player coalition {1, 2, 3} will form and divide the payoff 72 in some appropriate way. Now suppose that .. (player 1) and .. happen to meet each other in the absence of P.. There is little doubt that they would quickly seize the opportunity to form the coalition {作者: 大笑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:31
Link Formation in Cooperative Situations, cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation s作者: 對(duì)手 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:12
Network Formation Models With Costs for Establishing Links,ibed by a cooperative game. We concentrate on the influence that the existence of costs for establishing communication links has on the communication networks that are formed. The starting points in this paper are two game-theoretic models of the formation of communication links that were studied in作者: 有惡意 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:02
Network Formation With Sequential Demands,f division is therefore endogenous. We show that if the value of networks satisfies size monotonicity, then each and every equilibrium network is efficient. The result holds not only when players make absolute participation demands, but also when they are allowed to make link-specific demands.作者: infantile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:21 作者: Indebted 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:46
A strategic analysis of network reliability,ks and efficient networks..We find that if the society is large, and link formation costs are moderate, Nash networks as well as efficient networks will be ‘super-connected’, i.e. every link is redundant in the sense that the network remains connected even after the link is deleted. This contrasts w作者: 策略 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:41
A Dynamic Model of Network Formation,network configurations will arise. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework, where self-interested individuals can form and sever links. We determine which network structures the formation process will converge to. This information allows us to determine whether or not the 作者: 改變立場(chǎng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 17:11 作者: CANDY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:36 作者: Valves 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:33
,Buyers’ and Sellers’ Cartels on Markets With Indivisible Goods,model. When cartels are formed only on one side of the market, there is at most one stable cartel size. When cartels are formed sequentially on the two sides of the market, there is also at most one stable cartel configuration. Under bilateral collusion, buyers and sellers form cartels of equal size作者: 黃瓜 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:43 作者: Venules 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:15
Book 2003and groups, we were happy to accept because of the growing research on this important topic. We were also pleasantly surprised at the response to our request for submissions to the special issue, receiving a much larger number of sub- missions than we had anticipated. In the end we were able to put 作者: dowagers-hump 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:34 作者: EXPEL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:24 作者: 藝術(shù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:05 作者: Aboveboard 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:21 作者: 多嘴多舌 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:27
A Dynamic Model of Network Formation,sever links. We determine which network structures the formation process will converge to. This information allows us to determine whether or not the formation process will converge to an efficient network structure.作者: Obstreperous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:38
Spatial Social Networks,e extensive form game that describes the formation of links in our spatial environment. Finally, we identify the conditions under which the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these network formation games are stable.作者: Audiometry 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 12:35 作者: Albinism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:06 作者: 擁擠前 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:41 作者: coltish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 03:43
Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Valud not want to risk offering, say, 4 to .. (and dividing the remaining 68 among themselves), because they would realize that once .. is invited to participate in the negotiations, the situation turns “wide open” — anything can happen.作者: 考博 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:50
A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks,that captures characteristics of a variety of industries, the paper shows that buyers and sellers, acting strategically in their own self-interests, can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare.作者: 過(guò)渡時(shí)期 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:48
Competition for Goods in Buyer-Seller Networks,t different agents’ bargaining power. Even distant links may have large effects on agents’ earnings. These payoff results, and the identification of the paths themselves, should prove useful to further analysis of network structure.作者: 牽連 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 14:35
,Buyers’ and Sellers’ Cartels on Markets With Indivisible Goods,s, and the cartels formed are smaller than under unilateral collusion. Both the buyers’ and sellers’ cartels choose to exclude only one trader from the market. This result suggests that there are limits to bilateral collusion, and that the threat of collusion on one side of the market does not lead to increased collusion on the other side.作者: homeostasis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:13 作者: Hay-Fever 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 00:09
2510-3970 onomic Design on the formation of networks and groups, we were happy to accept because of the growing research on this important topic. We were also pleasantly surprised at the response to our request for submissions to the special issue, receiving a much larger number of sub- missions than we had a作者: BLAZE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 02:42
Bhaskar Dutta,Matthew O. JacksonIncludes supplementary material: 作者: BOOST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 07:44 作者: Bombast 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:38 作者: 束縛 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 14:52 作者: 預(yù)測(cè) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 18:36 作者: 坦白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 23:47
Graphs and Cooperation in Games,re, are studied for games in characteristic function form. Fair allocation rules are defined, and these are proven to be unique, closely related to the Shapley value, and stable for a wide class of games.作者: 小步走路 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 02:51 作者: Accrue 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 06:30
Network Formation With Sequential Demands,f division is therefore endogenous. We show that if the value of networks satisfies size monotonicity, then each and every equilibrium network is efficient. The result holds not only when players make absolute participation demands, but also when they are allowed to make link-specific demands.作者: DRILL 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 10:33
On the Formation of Networks and Groups,We provide an introduction to and overview of the volume on ..作者: sparse 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 16:20 作者: crockery 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 20:27
2510-3970 re on the formation of networks. These papers were published in other journals, and we are very grateful to the authors as well as the journals for permission to include these papers in the book.978-3-642-07719-7978-3-540-24790-6Series ISSN 2510-3970 Series E-ISSN 2510-3989
