標題: Titlebook: Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory - LOFT 8; 8th International Co Giacomo Bonanno,Benedikt L?we,Wiebe Hoek Conference pr [打印本頁] 作者: deduce 時間: 2025-3-21 19:02
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書目名稱Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory - LOFT 8讀者反饋
書目名稱Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory - LOFT 8讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 騷動 時間: 2025-3-21 20:31 作者: AXIOM 時間: 2025-3-22 00:39
A Runs-and-Systems Semantics for Logics of Announcements,op a concrete semantics using runs and systems. The advantage is that we can devise models that capture scenarios without having to express properties of those scenarios within the logic itself. In this concrete setting, we study honesty as well as belief in the presence of announcements that are not broadcast to all agents in a system.作者: CRACY 時間: 2025-3-22 04:33
From Nash to Dependency Equilibria,on of a dependency equilibrium; e.g., cooperation in the single-shot prisoners’ dilemma is a dependency equilibrium. The paper argues this notion to be meaningful and significant and sketches some of its consequences.作者: intricacy 時間: 2025-3-22 12:05
Bridges between Dynamic Doxastic and Doxastic Temporal Logics,wise evolution of a doxastic model under successive ‘priority updates’. This allows for merges, where, in particular, the notion of a ’temporal protocol’ defining a global information process (for instance of communication or learning) can be introduced into the more local dynamic perspective.作者: Ige326 時間: 2025-3-22 14:06 作者: jettison 時間: 2025-3-22 19:08
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/l/image/587995.jpg作者: inveigh 時間: 2025-3-22 21:29
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15164-4artificial intelligence; decision making; decision theory; deontic logic; dynamic logic; epistemic logic; 作者: BALE 時間: 2025-3-23 05:02 作者: NOTCH 時間: 2025-3-23 08:16 作者: Tincture 時間: 2025-3-23 12:32
Infinite Coordination Games,games of infinite duration with only two payoffs. We show that, on this kind of games, the procedure of eliminating weakly dominated strategies is independent of the elimination order and that, under maximal simultaneous elimination, the procedure converges after at most . many stages.作者: 財政 時間: 2025-3-23 17:01 作者: 財政 時間: 2025-3-23 22:03 作者: blackout 時間: 2025-3-24 00:52 作者: Density 時間: 2025-3-24 03:32
0302-9743 Overview: High quality selected papers Unique visibility State of the art research978-3-642-15163-7978-3-642-15164-4Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: 一大群 時間: 2025-3-24 10:19
Multi-agent Belief Revision with Linked Preferences,ting if a majority believes (or: is in favour of) the proposition that is under discussion. A special case of these meetings is judgement aggregation, and we apply our framework to the discursive dilemma in this field. Our framework has obvious connections to coalition logic and social choice theory作者: 營養(yǎng) 時間: 2025-3-24 14:02
Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory - LOFT 88th International Co作者: 拒絕 時間: 2025-3-24 18:37
Infinite Coordination Games,games of infinite duration with only two payoffs. We show that, on this kind of games, the procedure of eliminating weakly dominated strategies is independent of the elimination order and that, under maximal simultaneous elimination, the procedure converges after at most . many stages.作者: Cloudburst 時間: 2025-3-24 20:20
Correspondences in the Theory of Aggregation,ogic. The result of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, preference aggregation on total preorders is proven equivalent to the aggregation of specific types of judgments. On the other hand, judgment aggregation on propositional logic is proven equivalent to the aggregation of specific types of pre作者: Adulate 時間: 2025-3-24 23:36
Preference Change Triggered by Belief Change: A Principled Approach, preferences evolving after some new fact has been learned. Four properties are concerned with persistence of preferences when something being preferred is (partly) satisfied or dissatisfied, and formalize that preference change indicates that the ideal state has not been reached or has become unrea作者: 北極熊 時間: 2025-3-25 04:37 作者: Minuet 時間: 2025-3-25 10:29
From Nash to Dependency Equilibria,s is constitutive of normal form games, the independence of the decisions may and should be given up. This leads to the wider and quite different notion of a dependency equilibrium; e.g., cooperation in the single-shot prisoners’ dilemma is a dependency equilibrium. The paper argues this notion to b作者: FOIL 時間: 2025-3-25 12:55
Bridges between Dynamic Doxastic and Doxastic Temporal Logics,cs computing stepwise updates, and temporal doxastic logics describing global system evolutions. Following earlier results linking dynamic-epistemic and epistemic-temporal logics, we prove representation theorems showing under which conditions a doxastic temporal model can be represented as the step作者: 溫順 時間: 2025-3-25 19:11 作者: 煩憂 時間: 2025-3-25 20:23 作者: 宮殿般 時間: 2025-3-26 01:23
6樓作者: cushion 時間: 2025-3-26 05:46
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