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作者: 誤解    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:08
書目名稱Game Theory and Applications影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications被引頻次




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications年度引用




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications讀者反饋




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications讀者反饋學(xué)科排名





作者: lambaste    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:29

作者: accrete    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:57

作者: 灌溉    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:50
Sprechwissenschaft & Psycholinguistik 5 requires backward induction as a different solution method and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as a refinement of the solution concept that explicitly considers that a consistent and rational decision is made in each stage of the game (subgame). In this context, it is also discussed how the se
作者: 通情達(dá)理    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:59
Paula Irik,Irene Maijer-Kruijssenoffs can extend over many periods in the future, it is shown how the present value of a cash flow can be calculated by discounting. Repeated games can have a stationary structure, i.e., the game, including the payoffs and strategy options, remains unchanged, or a non-stationary structure, i.e., the
作者: Respond    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:03
Einzelbesprechung der Sprengstoffeon about key aspects or parameters of their opponent (technically, they do not know “their opponent‘s type”), such as the co-player’s strategies or payoffs. As a result, each player must form expectations about the co-player’s behavior, which can also change during the course of the game. The soluti
作者: Respond    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:12

作者: synovium    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:43
Marten Deinum,Daniel Rubio,Josh Longf companies on markets. The examples cover topics like competition on price (e.g. Bertrand-competition), market share (e.g. Cournot competition and advertising), strategic incentives for investment (e.g. R&D and technical standards), incentive mechanisms for compensation as well as implications of m
作者: 牢騷    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:33

作者: 節(jié)約    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:28
Decision Theory of the world, i.e., the scenarios in which events can occur. The information depends on whether the probability of the states is unknown (fundamental uncertainty) or known (risk). The various decision rules are illustrated and critically discussed using an example. Subsequently, the applicability o
作者: vasospasm    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:21
Basic Concepts payoffs. The players are the relevant decision-makers who decide about an action from their strategy space. Depending on the joint decisions, the payoffs ultimately result, which provide information about the players’ incentives. Also relevant is the game sequence and information structure, i.e., w
作者: Nonporous    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:57

作者: 積云    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:31

作者: 熱情贊揚(yáng)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:14

作者: reaching    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:33

作者: Militia    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:36

作者: 向外    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:45

作者: judiciousness    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:26
Public Finance Application Examplest and citizens. In particular, the selected problems analyze incentive mechanisms in the context of elections (median voter theorem and Clarke-Grove-mechanism), the provision of public goods, taxation and reform policy.
作者: 有常識(shí)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:50

作者: 高腳酒杯    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:22

作者: 昏睡中    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:34
Simultaneous Gamesespond to certain situations from everyday life and the world of business. The chapter also discusses whether the expected game outcomes are efficient from an economic point of view, i.e., whether there is potential for improvement. Finally, it is shown how an equilibrium can also be calculated for continuous strategies.
作者: minimal    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:42

作者: athlete’s-foot    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:42
Sprechwissenschaft & Psycholinguistik 5quence of moves can lead to different advantages for the players. Players may thus have an incentive to influence the outcome of the game to their advantage—but this is often only possible if they can credibly commit themselves and empty threats are excluded. The analysis concludes with a consideration of sequential games in continuous strategies.
作者: 失望昨天    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:51

作者: Communal    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:11
Paula Irik,Irene Maijer-Kruijssena distinction must be made here between a finite and an infinite number of repetitions. In the latter case, the strategy space expands considerably, so that almost any game outcome can be achieved through a suitable choice of strategy and thus problematic game outcomes can be overcome.
作者: 中古    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:42

作者: habile    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-94350-7 uncertainty) or known (risk). The various decision rules are illustrated and critically discussed using an example. Subsequently, the applicability of these rules is examined if the outcome does not depend on chance but on the decision of another decision-maker, i.e., if there is a strategic interaction as analyzed in game theory.
作者: 考古學(xué)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:35

作者: 一窩小鳥    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:48

作者: 協(xié)定    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:12
Marten Deinum,Daniel Rubio,Josh Longvertising), strategic incentives for investment (e.g. R&D and technical standards), incentive mechanisms for compensation as well as implications of market regulation (e.g. lobbying and anti-competitive behavior such as cartels).
作者: 使更活躍    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:30
Decision Theory uncertainty) or known (risk). The various decision rules are illustrated and critically discussed using an example. Subsequently, the applicability of these rules is examined if the outcome does not depend on chance but on the decision of another decision-maker, i.e., if there is a strategic interaction as analyzed in game theory.
作者: Esalate    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:27

作者: 祖先    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:17

作者: 新陳代謝    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:28

作者: 溫和女孩    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:12
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-8649-4t and citizens. In particular, the selected problems analyze incentive mechanisms in the context of elections (median voter theorem and Clarke-Grove-mechanism), the provision of public goods, taxation and reform policy.
作者: 牛馬之尿    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:47
Public Finance Application Examplest and citizens. In particular, the selected problems analyze incentive mechanisms in the context of elections (median voter theorem and Clarke-Grove-mechanism), the provision of public goods, taxation and reform policy.
作者: adequate-intake    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:47

作者: 壓碎    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:41

作者: Presbycusis    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:34

作者: opalescence    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:17

作者: 積習(xí)已深    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:09

作者: stress-test    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:57
Mathematical BasicsThis chapter gives a brief introduction to the mathematical foundations required for the various concepts discussed in this book. In particular, basic methods such as calculus and optimization are explained in a beginner-friendly way. Additional exercises help the reader to become more familiar with the mathematical concepts and to practice them.
作者: Androgen    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:28

作者: Hamper    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:08

作者: Sedative    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:08

作者: Inclement    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:07
2627-2601 e erm?glichen es, die vorgestellten Themen selbst nachzuvollziehen. Für die Lektüre werden lediglich elementare Stochastik-Kenntnisse vorausgesetzt..978-3-642-55252-6978-3-642-55253-3Series ISSN 2627-2601 Series E-ISSN 2627-261X
作者: PIZZA    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:19
gency collaboration and professional autonomy. Each themed section includes in-depth chapters from different Nordic countries, outlining and analysing the practice and outcomes of the collaborative work engaged in by Barnahus from different perspectives. The introductory and concluding chapters offe
作者: Magnitude    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:45

作者: Foregery    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:14

作者: Virtues    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:41
Allgemeiner Bauplan des peripheren Nervensystems im Vorderhorn des Rückenmarkes liegen. Sie treten in der vorderen (ventralen) Wurzel aus dem Rückenmark heraus und laufen gebündelt zu ihren verschiedenen Erfolgsorganen. Die in der Peripherie liegenden Sinneszellen (Rezeptoren) werden von Nerven ?versorgt?, deren Zellen neben dem Rückenmark in den
作者: 自制    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 08:47

作者: 地牢    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 16:03
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17854-3Plant ecophysiology; Mangroves; Abiotic stress; Salinity; Saline environments; Salt marshes; Morphological




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