標題: Titlebook: Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems; Theory and Implicati Markus Berndt Book 2002 Deutscher Universit?ts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesba [打印本頁] 作者: APL 時間: 2025-3-21 17:10
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems被引頻次
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems年度引用
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems讀者反饋
書目名稱Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems讀者反饋學科排名
作者: 抒情短詩 時間: 2025-3-21 20:51 作者: 能得到 時間: 2025-3-22 02:16
Carsten Baumgarth,Dirk-Mario Boltzts are not specific to the dichotomy of the insider system on one side and the outsider system on the other side, as it has been discussed throughout the previous chapters. Hence, coordination benefits are dealt with separately in this chapter.作者: 欺騙世家 時間: 2025-3-22 08:17 作者: Jacket 時間: 2025-3-22 12:07 作者: 亞當心理陰影 時間: 2025-3-22 15:33
f ownership concentration, illiquid capital markets, and a high level of crossholdings. Countries with an "outsider system" are characterized by widely dispersed ownership, liquid stock markets, a low level of inter-corporate crossholdings, and an active market for corporate control...Markus Berndt 作者: 亞當心理陰影 時間: 2025-3-22 19:30
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-66011-5 for the foregone private benefits that come with the sale. This compensation takes the form of a voting premium that is paid when acquiring control blocks. Empirical research has quantified this premium to range from 5.4% in the US to 82% in Italy. An overview of these empirical finding is given by Macey (1998, p. 910).作者: Aura231 時間: 2025-3-22 22:30 作者: Diuretic 時間: 2025-3-23 02:49
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20948-4ion between the party (the agents) that takes some action on behalf of outsiders (principals), combined with the fact that results are not perfectly correlated with efforts of the insiders. Depending on the timing of contracting, action of the agent, and random influences of nature, one distinguishes between . or . and ., as well as ..作者: 褪色 時間: 2025-3-23 09:13
Introduction,ional foundations for well-functioning equity markets: .. The most cited corporate governance principles are laid out by the OECD (1999). The World Bank concentrates on implementation strategies.. Emphasis on regulatory aspects is put by the IOSCO (1998).作者: 額外的事 時間: 2025-3-23 11:14
Analytical Framework,ion between the party (the agents) that takes some action on behalf of outsiders (principals), combined with the fact that results are not perfectly correlated with efforts of the insiders. Depending on the timing of contracting, action of the agent, and random influences of nature, one distinguishes between . or . and ., as well as ..作者: NICE 時間: 2025-3-23 17:46
Patrick Bartels,Michael H. Breitnertervention is endogenized. It is assumed that a public-regarding legislator takes the corporate governance systems of firms as given and sets the law accordingly. As will be shown, this behavior increases the stability of the resulting financial systems.作者: fibula 時間: 2025-3-23 18:13 作者: 斜坡 時間: 2025-3-23 23:57 作者: Concerto 時間: 2025-3-24 04:58 作者: 按等級 時間: 2025-3-24 08:31
Concentrated Control - the Insider System, for the foregone private benefits that come with the sale. This compensation takes the form of a voting premium that is paid when acquiring control blocks. Empirical research has quantified this premium to range from 5.4% in the US to 82% in Italy. An overview of these empirical finding is given by Macey (1998, p. 910).作者: 刺穿 時間: 2025-3-24 14:23 作者: 障礙 時間: 2025-3-24 15:07 作者: 排斥 時間: 2025-3-24 23:01
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20948-4 of capital, as proven by Modigliani and Miller (1958). In their seminal paper, however, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the separation of ownership and control that is associated with corporate finance produces agency costs. Classical agency costs arise from asymmetric distribution of informat作者: 發(fā)起 時間: 2025-3-25 01:47 作者: BRINK 時間: 2025-3-25 04:54 作者: Immortal 時間: 2025-3-25 08:15
Patrick Bartels,Michael H. Breitners is separated in three parts. After the setup, it is first shown how the interaction of corporate governance and capital markets produces network effects that lead to a persistent coordination of corporate governance strategies between firms. In this section, the influence of law is taken as exogen作者: CLOT 時間: 2025-3-25 13:21
Nicole Baumüller,Carsten Baumgarthaw enforcement, ..). The reason for this is straightforward. The easier it is for an agent to exploit the principal, the higher are the resulting agency cost. Since the outsider system relies heavily on arm’s length financing supported by the legal system it is reasonable to assume that the autonomo作者: 空洞 時間: 2025-3-25 17:38
Carsten Baumgarth,Dirk-Mario Boltzades. The resulting implications for corporate governance reforms have been given in chapter 8. The analysis, so far, has focused on two sources of network effects that influence a corporate governance system. These are network effects via capital markets and network effects via regulation. This fin作者: JUST 時間: 2025-3-25 23:35 作者: LUT 時間: 2025-3-26 01:39 作者: delegate 時間: 2025-3-26 05:36
Differences in Corporate Governance Systems,stem” implies that it is made up of many components. It is inevitable to concentrate on some selected parts of an elaborate system. While this always entails the danger of missing important points, it is only by abstraction that we can learn anything at all about a complex topic like corporate gover作者: DOTE 時間: 2025-3-26 08:30
Analytical Framework, of capital, as proven by Modigliani and Miller (1958). In their seminal paper, however, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the separation of ownership and control that is associated with corporate finance produces agency costs. Classical agency costs arise from asymmetric distribution of informat作者: heterogeneous 時間: 2025-3-26 16:26
Dispersed Control - the Outsider System,e control (Hart, 1995). The logic of this is as follows. If the external environment and the particulars of a young firm that is about to go public render dispersed control the optimal governance strategy, a seller at an IPO has an incentive to choose the optimal institutional arrangements for this 作者: 預感 時間: 2025-3-26 19:26 作者: Talkative 時間: 2025-3-26 23:50
Evolutionary Model,s is separated in three parts. After the setup, it is first shown how the interaction of corporate governance and capital markets produces network effects that lead to a persistent coordination of corporate governance strategies between firms. In this section, the influence of law is taken as exogen作者: 神圣在玷污 時間: 2025-3-27 04:58 作者: gangrene 時間: 2025-3-27 06:22 作者: 結果 時間: 2025-3-27 10:23 作者: 放縱 時間: 2025-3-27 15:12 作者: 生氣的邊緣 時間: 2025-3-27 19:59
gnificant convergence of ownership structures and regulations? What are the legislative requirements in the different systems? How does globalization affect the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements? Which system should be chosen by developing countries?..978-3-8244-7694-7978-3-322-81431-9作者: obsolete 時間: 2025-3-27 23:15 作者: phase-2-enzyme 時間: 2025-3-28 02:05
Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems978-3-322-81431-9作者: 沉思的魚 時間: 2025-3-28 10:17 作者: 甜得發(fā)膩 時間: 2025-3-28 11:19
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0773-3As discussed in section 5.3.2, concentrated control comprises of strategic investment into illiquid assets that provide specific utility for the controlling owner. As mentioned earlier on, the right of ownership to a share consists of two rights.作者: CAB 時間: 2025-3-28 16:56 作者: Rotator-Cuff 時間: 2025-3-28 20:36
978-3-8244-7694-7Deutscher Universit?ts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden 2002作者: 廣告 時間: 2025-3-29 01:00 作者: nutrients 時間: 2025-3-29 06:27 作者: vitrectomy 時間: 2025-3-29 08:25
Differences in Corporate Governance Systems,stem” implies that it is made up of many components. It is inevitable to concentrate on some selected parts of an elaborate system. While this always entails the danger of missing important points, it is only by abstraction that we can learn anything at all about a complex topic like corporate governance.作者: 連鎖 時間: 2025-3-29 14:40
Conclusion,as always remained in this debate was the question why two different systems have evolved after World War II and persisted until today, namely the outsider system and the insider system. Both systems seem to have performed about equally well.作者: ETHER 時間: 2025-3-29 16:41
Denise H. Kenyon-Rouvinez,Gordon Adler,Guido Corbetta,Gianfilippo Cuneoict with those of entrepreneurship. The chapter then examines the progression of entrepreneurship in South Korea to see how its growth has affected people’s values systems and their perspective on the various groups’ roles in society. Lastly, we briefly discuss how Korea’s experience with entreprene作者: 營養(yǎng) 時間: 2025-3-29 23:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-4218-6Im nun folgenden Kapitel besch?ftige ich mich damit, welche methologischen Konsequenzen sich daraus ergeben, da? Familie als soziales System verstanden und Familientherapie auf systemtheoretischer Grundlage konzipiert wird.
