標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Games to Play and Games not to Play; Strategic Decisions Uri Weiss,Joseph Agassi Book 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) [打印本頁] 作者: 誓約 時間: 2025-3-21 19:15
書目名稱Games to Play and Games not to Play影響因子(影響力)
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書目名稱Games to Play and Games not to Play讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: defray 時間: 2025-3-21 20:18
Strategic Decisions,ounds? The legacy of Von Neumann and Morgenstern?may be enriched by applying a contribution of Nash?into the account of players’ choice of agenda as their primary decision, their choice, before playing, of what games not to play (war games, for example) and what games to play. This choice is a game 作者: Abrade 時間: 2025-3-22 03:33 作者: Intrepid 時間: 2025-3-22 08:04 作者: 無畏 時間: 2025-3-22 11:57 作者: 滔滔不絕地說 時間: 2025-3-22 16:04
The Game Theory of the European Union Versus the ,is the conditional generosity that the European Union (EU) practices with great success.AQ1These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: peace (or mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated p作者: 滔滔不絕地說 時間: 2025-3-22 17:27 作者: amorphous 時間: 2025-3-22 21:30
Mutual Threat: The Cold War Game,en the USSR and US as a super-game in which every country can refuse playing the (repeat) game of chicken. We will discuss some subsets of the chicken game: the simultaneous one versus the sequential one, one with free information and one without free information, one with an option of communication作者: 邊緣 時間: 2025-3-23 03:07 作者: 領(lǐng)先 時間: 2025-3-23 05:57 作者: fender 時間: 2025-3-23 13:38
Cooperative Game Theory Mobilized for Peace,paucity of its applications. Yet, some small changes in the theory, particularly enabling small changes in games, may change both the theory and the games for the better. Abstaining from playing risky games is clearly commendable, and so is the search for peaceful means for the prevention of playing作者: 小溪 時間: 2025-3-23 14:34
A General Theory of Choice,given game. This renders game theory applicable to real situations. We recommend a combination of Abraham Wald’s recommendation to choose between different potential errors with Herbert Simon’s recommendation considering our acceptance of any offer we find sufficiently satisfactory. This renders wha作者: 發(fā)現(xiàn) 時間: 2025-3-23 21:54 作者: Antioxidant 時間: 2025-3-24 01:02 作者: Generalize 時間: 2025-3-24 04:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-02606-6heir primary decision, their choice, before playing, of what games not to play (war games, for example) and what games to play. This choice is a game that precedes the games that traditional game theory studies.作者: ARC 時間: 2025-3-24 08:37 作者: 2否定 時間: 2025-3-24 12:32 作者: 無法破譯 時間: 2025-3-24 14:52
A General Theory of Choice,erent potential errors with Herbert Simon’s recommendation considering our acceptance of any offer we find sufficiently satisfactory. This renders what is found satisfactory revisable and thus it renders Simon’s proposal more realistic.作者: ALT 時間: 2025-3-24 21:52 作者: committed 時間: 2025-3-25 03:04
Equilibria of War and Peace: Diverse Options of Cooperation,eoretical equilibrium over Nash equilibrium is this. A mistaken move is commoner than the choice of the best move available. Considerations of both kinds bring game theory nearer to Wald’s decision theory.作者: 和音 時間: 2025-3-25 06:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58784-9a game to play: possibly all players will stay with a particular game even though they will all benefit from moving from that game to another possible game.People may adhere to the equilibrium of war even when they have an option of peace: they may avoid peace negotiations out of ignorance of the need to change both the game and the strategy.作者: 貿(mào)易 時間: 2025-3-25 11:12
The Game Not Chosen,a game to play: possibly all players will stay with a particular game even though they will all benefit from moving from that game to another possible game.People may adhere to the equilibrium of war even when they have an option of peace: they may avoid peace negotiations out of ignorance of the need to change both the game and the strategy.作者: armistice 時間: 2025-3-25 15:40
Book 2023ame theory recommends diverse strategies (plans of actions) for various given games, particularly those in Nash equilibria, in which no player benefits from one-sided strategy alteration. The literature also refers to the design of games that fit given goals. This is the mechanism design theory; its作者: 不妥協(xié) 時間: 2025-3-25 19:47 作者: 火光在搖曳 時間: 2025-3-25 22:47
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49463-9ave practical results.2 We argue that when the norm is to respect agreements, agreements improve cooperation even in one-time stag hunt game. It goes well with the proposal to consider game theory part-and-parcel of social science: how does playing in a given game depend on the culture within which it takes place.作者: disparage 時間: 2025-3-26 03:13
Verwendung als Entscheidungsmodell, game played by the European Union, we contend, is nearer to the stag hunt game than to the prisoner’s dilemma game. Every European Union country recently (rightly, of course) recognizes peace as best—and thus as better than an attack on a defenceless neighbour that would lead to an immediate victory.作者: Amendment 時間: 2025-3-26 04:27 作者: 開玩笑 時間: 2025-3-26 08:40 作者: HATCH 時間: 2025-3-26 15:46 作者: 藕床生厭倦 時間: 2025-3-26 18:30 作者: Foreknowledge 時間: 2025-3-26 22:41 作者: –scent 時間: 2025-3-27 04:32 作者: innate 時間: 2025-3-27 05:42 作者: 滑稽 時間: 2025-3-27 11:24 作者: 親屬 時間: 2025-3-27 16:08
Toward Optimistic Future,f them.We recommend a methodology that renders game theory part-and-parcel of social science. Also, we distinguish pure game theory which is a branch of mathematics from applied game theory which is a part of the social sciences. Pure game theory is certain and does not refer to reality, whereas app作者: 無能力之人 時間: 2025-3-27 20:59
2198-4182 age? Obviously, it is advisable to encourage playing some groups of games such as trade, as well as to discourage playing other groups of games such as wars. This shift makes the theory much more applicable to 978-3-031-27603-3978-3-031-27601-9Series ISSN 2198-4182 Series E-ISSN 2198-4190 作者: 貿(mào)易 時間: 2025-3-27 22:28 作者: Cerebrovascular 時間: 2025-3-28 03:20
Nachweis und Bestimmung der Carbonylgruppee—aiming at minimizing loss. This raises a discussion of the question, what set of games is advisable to encourage? It is advisable to encourage playing some groups of games, such as trade, and discourages playing other groups of games, such as wars. This shift makes the theory much more applicable 作者: Exuberance 時間: 2025-3-28 07:42
Formulierung der Optimierungsaufgabe,true, they are true often enough to justify the study of such cases.) Still, why should we assume that the rules of any game are given? Perhaps when discussing the economic behaviour of entrepreneurs we may admit that they often take the rules for their conduct as given. But when discussing interact作者: Patrimony 時間: 2025-3-28 12:43 作者: ASSET 時間: 2025-3-28 14:51
Analyse stochastischer Schwingungssysteme,ith big enough probability is sufficient in order to prevent the other side from attacking. (Ellsberg actually proposed to minimize the price of deterrence, while Schelling did not see the price). We argue that Russel’s proposal is better, and Ellsberg’s is a better choice of the plan of action in t作者: synchronous 時間: 2025-3-28 20:38
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29931-6d playing for the same reason. Also, integrating cooperative game-theory into the social sciences may encourage study of the conditions that help promote peace and cooperation. In addition, it is commendable to import these achievements of non-cooperative game theory to cooperative game theory. The 作者: 阻止 時間: 2025-3-29 00:39 作者: 就職 時間: 2025-3-29 03:14
Uri Weiss,Joseph AgassiProvides an insight about the choice of games to play and to avoid.Includes theoretical discussions of equilibria resting on error regarding choices of games to play.Discusses the possibility of chang作者: Reservation 時間: 2025-3-29 09:08
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27601-9Game Theory; Game theory and peace; Mechanism Design; Prisoner‘s Dilemma; Incentives for Peace; Freedom o作者: orthodox 時間: 2025-3-29 14:22
Nachweis und Bestimmung der Carbonylgruppe) for diverse games, particularly those in Nash equilibria, namely, those in which no player benefits from altering strategies while opponents stick to theirs. Surprisingly, sometimes the potential gain from moving from one Nash equilibrium to another is no incentive for players to act accordingly. 作者: Charade 時間: 2025-3-29 16:02 作者: Foam-Cells 時間: 2025-3-29 21:02 作者: Orchiectomy 時間: 2025-3-30 03:25 作者: wangle 時間: 2025-3-30 04:25
Formulierung der Optimierungsaufgabe,ic Behaviour” it is as related to economics as to sociology, politology, and even peace studies. It is not clear at all how what it adds to these fields integrates in them. Discussions of games begin with descriptions of them, not descriptions of who plays them and why. If we know about any interact作者: indoctrinate 時間: 2025-3-30 08:20
Verwendung als Entscheidungsmodell,is the conditional generosity that the European Union (EU) practices with great success.AQ1These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: peace (or mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated p作者: CBC471 時間: 2025-3-30 12:54
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-90181-1ation in the shadow of the sword, i.e. a negotiation in which each side knows that if the parties do not achieve an agreement, the alternative may be a war, and thus the bargaining position of its party is function of their capacities in a case of war. Negotiation in the shadow of international law 作者: 樣式 時間: 2025-3-30 18:00
Analyse stochastischer Schwingungssysteme,en the USSR and US as a super-game in which every country can refuse playing the (repeat) game of chicken. We will discuss some subsets of the chicken game: the simultaneous one versus the sequential one, one with free information and one without free information, one with an option of communication作者: calorie 時間: 2025-3-31 00:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-93374-5cal equilibrium is different. It occurs when no player sees incentives to change strategy unilaterally. A game may be in Nash equilibrium and not in game-theoretical equilibrium due to mistaken judgment. The advantage of Nash equilibrium over game-theoretical one is obvious. The advantage of game-th作者: Graduated 時間: 2025-3-31 01:48
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58784-9 games but also what game to play. We propose different new equilibria of super-games that comprise choices of plans for what games to play and for how to play them.? Nash theory allows for equilibria for games and for achieving inefficient equilibria in some games. Similarly, the theory should allo
