標題: Titlebook: Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia; Motoshi Suzuki,Akira Okada Book 2017 Springer Japan KK 2017 Diplomacy.Game theory.International [打印本頁] 作者: Filament 時間: 2025-3-21 16:45
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia被引頻次
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia年度引用
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia讀者反饋
書目名稱Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia讀者反饋學科排名
作者: Spina-Bifida 時間: 2025-3-21 22:52
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-2370-0estic and international media, who are able to verify information, incentivize countries to share private information and provide even greater incentives when these agencies incur a favorable bias in information transmission. Conversely, countries surrounded by hostile international media and relati作者: 變色龍 時間: 2025-3-22 01:11 作者: 擁護者 時間: 2025-3-22 07:23
Problemstellung, Ziel und Inhalt der Arbeit, possible if the status quo is unfavorable both to the agenda setter and the pivotal voter. This result agrees with the empirical observations of the Ottawa Process where Canada successfully induced a comprehensive ban of anti-personnel landmines despite opposition.作者: 皮薩 時間: 2025-3-22 11:49
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-92421-6eds) The political economy of trade policy: papers in honor of Jagdish Bhagwati. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996), Milner and Rosendorff (J Confl Resolut 41:117–146, 1997), and Ishiguro (Kobe Univ Econ Rev 53:9–30, 2007), we expand upon their models and analyze domestic reforms, such as agricultural 作者: 朋黨派系 時間: 2025-3-22 16:31
Nachweis und Bestimmung der Carbonylgruppe analysis hypothesizes that, when the borrower assumes foreign policy neutralism, the lenders issue greater loan contracts than what they believe are optimal and that this excess persists as long as the lenders refuse to delegate the lending tasks to a common international financial institution that作者: 朋黨派系 時間: 2025-3-22 18:47
Nachweis und Bestimmung der Hydroxylgruppent on foreign reserve swaps between states’ central banks or the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) to prevent another crisis, East Asian states used an institutional link to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a mechanism to overcome these problems and relied on an intra-regional communication channe作者: 無脊椎 時間: 2025-3-22 22:02
Book 2017l variations divide contemporary Asia, making regional institutional cooperation difficult and prompting some Asian states to use global or inter-regional arrangements in order to obtain benefits of cooperation.. Qualifications are provided for this line of argument in the first chapter, which also 作者: 同步左右 時間: 2025-3-23 01:48 作者: magnanimity 時間: 2025-3-23 07:41 作者: Overstate 時間: 2025-3-23 12:38
An Agenda-Setting Game of the Landmine Ban Treaty possible if the status quo is unfavorable both to the agenda setter and the pivotal voter. This result agrees with the empirical observations of the Ottawa Process where Canada successfully induced a comprehensive ban of anti-personnel landmines despite opposition.作者: gentle 時間: 2025-3-23 17:09
FTA/EPA Negotiations and Domestic Reforms in Two-Level Games Analysiseds) The political economy of trade policy: papers in honor of Jagdish Bhagwati. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996), Milner and Rosendorff (J Confl Resolut 41:117–146, 1997), and Ishiguro (Kobe Univ Econ Rev 53:9–30, 2007), we expand upon their models and analyze domestic reforms, such as agricultural 作者: Astigmatism 時間: 2025-3-23 19:13 作者: Servile 時間: 2025-3-23 22:11 作者: 上釉彩 時間: 2025-3-24 04:19
Book 2017Society for the Promotion of Science. The authors of the individual chapters show that Asian states play games of conflict and cooperation strategically by creating, changing, or destroying institutions. For them, conflict and cooperation are inseparable phenomena and are integral parts of states’ s作者: GLOOM 時間: 2025-3-24 09:47 作者: 女上癮 時間: 2025-3-24 14:01
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-22095-2e less likely to fit rational choice model to explain their political decisions. The dataset on individual self-defense claims to the UN Security Council tells that there is a general evidence to support the arguments of this chapter.作者: 無政府主義者 時間: 2025-3-24 17:46 作者: 殘忍 時間: 2025-3-24 20:10
A Rational Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia,es and their use of values and ideas to promote their preferences. This insight motivates the game-theoretical analyses of this edited volume’s subsequent ten chapters investigating the problems and prospects of institutional cooperation in contemporary Asia.作者: Console 時間: 2025-3-25 00:42
Politics Over the Claim of Individual Self-Defense at Wars: Aid Conditionality and Reciprocity in Ase less likely to fit rational choice model to explain their political decisions. The dataset on individual self-defense claims to the UN Security Council tells that there is a general evidence to support the arguments of this chapter.作者: 鞠躬 時間: 2025-3-25 03:32
The Paradox of Compliance: Does Legalization Increase Compliance in Trade Disputes?nalysis shows that more difficult cases have been filed under the WTO. Hence, the proportion of disputes that have failed to be resolved after adjudication has increased, leading to the abovementioned paradox.作者: conformity 時間: 2025-3-25 11:17
,Grundlegende Zusammenh?nge und Begriffe,is suggests that the manipulation of collective self-defense does not help Prime Minister Abe and his government achieve the security policy objectives that they claim invoking collective self- defense would deliver.作者: 浪蕩子 時間: 2025-3-25 12:12 作者: 生意行為 時間: 2025-3-25 16:35
Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Allianceis suggests that the manipulation of collective self-defense does not help Prime Minister Abe and his government achieve the security policy objectives that they claim invoking collective self- defense would deliver.作者: artless 時間: 2025-3-25 19:58
International Cooperation and Institution Formation: A Game Theoretic Perspectivee perfect equilibrium if and only if the group satisfies the criticality condition. Some of the implications on the international frameworks that attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in East Asia are finally discussed.作者: 砍伐 時間: 2025-3-26 03:37 作者: athlete’s-foot 時間: 2025-3-26 08:17 作者: 預示 時間: 2025-3-26 11:51
978-4-431-56794-3Springer Japan KK 2017作者: 浪費物質(zhì) 時間: 2025-3-26 16:41 作者: 表主動 時間: 2025-3-26 17:42 作者: llibretto 時間: 2025-3-26 21:23
,Grundlegende Zusammenh?nge und Begriffe,fense as intervention into an armed conflict on behalf of an ally. Since the Japanese government’s reinterpretation of the constitutional constraint on collective self- defense is perceived by neighboring countries as a revelation of underlying militarism and expansionism, I analyze Japan’s decision作者: 可轉(zhuǎn)變 時間: 2025-3-27 04:11 作者: 最小 時間: 2025-3-27 08:21 作者: 血統(tǒng) 時間: 2025-3-27 13:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-22095-2al and collective rights of self-defense (Article 51). The chapter indicates that the decision over whether a self-defense claim is to be filed to the UN Security Council depends on reciprocal relations with the other state involved in the conflict as well as a key hegemonic power state (e.g. the Un作者: 職業(yè)拳擊手 時間: 2025-3-27 14:32 作者: 薄膜 時間: 2025-3-27 18:16 作者: 征稅 時間: 2025-3-27 22:03
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-92421-6rst, we discuss international trade negotiations and agricultural reforms. With respect to agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the following points were agreed upon: (1) the tariffication of nontariff barriers and, (2) the restraint of price-supporting policies and the promotion of direc作者: ETCH 時間: 2025-3-28 05:37 作者: 善辯 時間: 2025-3-28 06:50 作者: 宏偉 時間: 2025-3-28 12:08
Nachweis und Bestimmung der Hydroxylgrupperic information where states have differing expectations about appropriate institutional arrangements. In East Asia, coordination and information problems are aggravated by regional rivalries that constrain the flow of interstate communications. This chapter analyzes these problems using game-theory作者: 鄙視 時間: 2025-3-28 17:14 作者: 擋泥板 時間: 2025-3-28 19:12
A Rational Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia,m is still dominant. The rationalist program is founded upon objective ontology, contingent agent-structure epistemology, and the logic of consequence. In this chapter, I argue that rationality is an integral part of the Asian political tradition, constituting ancient military thought and medieval i作者: Infelicity 時間: 2025-3-29 00:17
Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Alliancefense as intervention into an armed conflict on behalf of an ally. Since the Japanese government’s reinterpretation of the constitutional constraint on collective self- defense is perceived by neighboring countries as a revelation of underlying militarism and expansionism, I analyze Japan’s decision作者: 脖子 時間: 2025-3-29 04:32 作者: Enteropathic 時間: 2025-3-29 07:21 作者: 公豬 時間: 2025-3-29 12:08 作者: Fillet,Filet 時間: 2025-3-29 15:59 作者: 很像弓] 時間: 2025-3-29 20:49
An Agenda-Setting Game of the Landmine Ban Treatyawa Convention) established in 1997. This unprecedented treaty was established due to the leadership of middle powers such as Canada and European countries with the support of NGOs, which overcame the opposition of the USA and Asian countries. A rationalist explanation models the change from the sta作者: PLE 時間: 2025-3-30 01:19
FTA/EPA Negotiations and Domestic Reforms in Two-Level Games Analysisrst, we discuss international trade negotiations and agricultural reforms. With respect to agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the following points were agreed upon: (1) the tariffication of nontariff barriers and, (2) the restraint of price-supporting policies and the promotion of direc作者: Digitalis 時間: 2025-3-30 04:33
The Paradox of Compliance: Does Legalization Increase Compliance in Trade Disputes?e comparison of dispute settlement under the former General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the current World Trade Organization (WTO), which has absorbed GATT into its fold, shows that there is no apparent increase in compliance despite a considerable increase in legalization. This chapte作者: nutrition 時間: 2025-3-30 11:54
Analyzing International Developmental Loan Markets with Rival Lendersices. Such a coordination failure is serious in the realm of developmental finance, where major states vie against one another in extending loan contracts to developing states through separate institutions. Competitive lending is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it may satisfy strong credit de作者: Robust 時間: 2025-3-30 14:17
