標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Games in Management Science; Essays in Honor of G Pierre-Olivier Pineau,Simon Sigué,Sihem Taboubi Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG [打印本頁] 作者: incontestable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:49
書目名稱Games in Management Science影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Games in Management Science影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Games in Management Science網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Games in Management Science網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Games in Management Science被引頻次
書目名稱Games in Management Science被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Games in Management Science年度引用
書目名稱Games in Management Science年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Games in Management Science讀者反饋
書目名稱Games in Management Science讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 消瘦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:42 作者: regale 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:47
The Effects of Consumer Rebates in a Competitive Distribution Channel,acturer, two-retailer channel and develop a two-period model where consumers’ preferences are distributed along a Hotelling line. The rebate consists in a price discount that can be redeemed on the second period. We solve three Stackelberg games: a benchmark where no rebate is offered, a symmetric g作者: 稀釋前 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:10
On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channels in a Duopoly with Advertising,cally integrated firms, whenever this is efficient for firms. This is particularly relevant when the vertical externality provokes distortions in the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D or advertising. The present model illustrates the possibility of using two-part tariffs endogenously defined as lin作者: nostrum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 09:02
Product Recalls and Channel Pricing, strategies in marketing channels. By doing so, we analyze whether vendor agreements between manufacturers and retailers, which are signed before any unit is sold, could distort channel profits by aggravating double marginalization. We characterize the equilibrium pricing strategies in closed form f作者: Pander 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:23
Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Price-Dependent Returns,e selling price. Both strategies influence the return rate, which is a state variable. The pricing strategy plays a key role in the identification of the best contract to achieve coordination as well as in achieving environmental objectives. The pricing strategy influences the return rate negatively作者: Pander 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:43
A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime, a necessary net-zero emission of GHGs in order to stabilize climate over the long term. We start from a situation where . coalitions exist and behave as . players in a game of sharing a global emission budget that can only be maintained by negative emission activities. We compare a fully “cooperati作者: 最小 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:00 作者: NUDGE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:22 作者: constitutional 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:27
Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition,dying how environmental emissions and tax payments alter the incentives business owners have to divert their managers from profit maximization in favor of sales revenue generation. Two scenarios are compared depending on whether the upstream supplier precommits to a fixed input price or adopts a fle作者: squander 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:17
A Dynamic Game with Interaction Between Kantian Players and Nashian Players,shian players, where we define Kantian agents as those who act in accordance with the categorical imperative. We revisit a well-known dynamic model of the tragedy of the commons and ask what would happen if not all agents are solely motivated by self interest. We establish that even without external作者: hypotension 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:42 作者: 驚奇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:32 作者: 并排上下 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:44 作者: 上流社會(huì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:04
Game Theory and Cyber Defense,f literature argues that the game-theoretic reasoning is well-suited to many problems in cyber defense. A game between a defender and an attacker trying to gain access to computers remotely is a typical strategic interaction in this domain. This chapter discusses how game theory can be applied in cy作者: BLUSH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:12
A LQ Vaccine Communication Game,vaccines are ineffective and even dangerous. We propose a model for this public health problem using the differential game framework and aspire to help understanding the effectiveness of communication policies. One player of the game is the health-care system, which aims to minimize the number of un作者: 匯總 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:46 作者: Vulnerary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:52
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-2-287-33478-8tegies is analyzed and the performance of open-loop and feedback incentive strategies is compared in their role of helping to sustain an agreement over time. We present numerical experiments to illustrate the results.作者: parsimony 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:05
,Untersuchung der flüssigen Fette,al results show that the higher the efficiency of the civil monitoring effort, the efficiency of institutions and the lower the discount rate; the higher the inertia which will lead the economy to a much earlier switch to good regime with low corruption as the jump occurs early.作者: acrimony 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:05
Rudolf Benedikt,Ferdinand Ulzer (Professor)ation combining game theory and other techniques. The chapter highlights the recognized challenges associated with the applicability of game theory in the cyber world. It discusses how the game-theoretic formalism can be adapted to obtain sound solutions in a reasonable time.作者: collateral 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:16 作者: 螢火蟲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:43 作者: MAIM 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:01
Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game,tegies is analyzed and the performance of open-loop and feedback incentive strategies is compared in their role of helping to sustain an agreement over time. We present numerical experiments to illustrate the results.作者: 全面 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:22
Building Efficient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game,al results show that the higher the efficiency of the civil monitoring effort, the efficiency of institutions and the lower the discount rate; the higher the inertia which will lead the economy to a much earlier switch to good regime with low corruption as the jump occurs early.作者: 背景 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:14
Game Theory and Cyber Defense,ation combining game theory and other techniques. The chapter highlights the recognized challenges associated with the applicability of game theory in the cyber world. It discusses how the game-theoretic formalism can be adapted to obtain sound solutions in a reasonable time.作者: 煩憂 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:47
A LQ Vaccine Communication Game, its profit. To pursue their objectives, the two players run suitable vaccination advertising campaigns. We study the open-loop Nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the two players and observe that the communication policy of the pharmaceutical firm helps the health-care system to decrease the number of unvaccinated people.作者: 思想 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:54 作者: 放縱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:43 作者: 曲解 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:44 作者: pellagra 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:00 作者: MODE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-87578-5rsonhood can help achieve efficient bargaining solutions between polluters and environmental entities. We also report on various approaches that have been taken in some countries to endow environmental persons with means to protect their rights.作者: exceed 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:18 作者: 收到 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:31
On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channels in a Duopoly with Advertising,ear functions of firms’ efforts to sterilize the vertical externality altogether in a duopoly where firms’ invest in advertising to increase brand equity. This is done first in a static model and then replicated in the differential game based upon the same building blocks.作者: 繼而發(fā)生 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:56 作者: ELATE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:12
A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime,ve” solution with a Nash equilibrium solution implemented through an international emission trading scheme. We characterize the fully cooperative and Nash equilibrium solutions for this game in a deterministic context.作者: 膽小懦夫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:14
Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games Through Environmental Personhood,rsonhood can help achieve efficient bargaining solutions between polluters and environmental entities. We also report on various approaches that have been taken in some countries to endow environmental persons with means to protect their rights.作者: HALO 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:27 作者: 友好關(guān)系 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:49 作者: accordance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:50 作者: 加劇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:02
A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing,gest a generalization of the Lanchester market share dynamics such that the rates at which firms attract market share from each other are determined not only by their advertising efforts but also by the consumer prices charged in the market. A full characterization of Nash equilibrium price and advertising strategies is obtained.作者: 一小塊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:24
A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics,marks. The second group covers contributions that design experiments that aim to find behavioral support for the use of specific types of strategies. Both the first and second groups exclusively use a discrete time framework. Finally, we discuss the exceptions in this literature that study behavior in continuous time.作者: cancer 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:40 作者: MORT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 12:56
A Dynamic Game with Interaction Between Kantian Players and Nashian Players, the tragedy of the commons and ask what would happen if not all agents are solely motivated by self interest. We establish that even without external punishment of violation of social norms, if a sufficiently large fraction of the population consists of Kantian agents, the tragedy of the commons can be substantially mitigated.作者: 桉樹 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:21
Book 2020hains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements..作者: 無表情 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:31
0884-8289 r Georges Zaccour.Examines a wide variety of game theory appThis book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of作者: strain 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:49
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85574-0gest a generalization of the Lanchester market share dynamics such that the rates at which firms attract market share from each other are determined not only by their advertising efforts but also by the consumer prices charged in the market. A full characterization of Nash equilibrium price and advertising strategies is obtained.作者: 不要嚴(yán)酷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:23
Abstimmungsmacht in Unternehmen,marks. The second group covers contributions that design experiments that aim to find behavioral support for the use of specific types of strategies. Both the first and second groups exclusively use a discrete time framework. Finally, we discuss the exceptions in this literature that study behavior in continuous time.作者: 不出名 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:24 作者: alcoholism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:51
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-91438-6 the tragedy of the commons and ask what would happen if not all agents are solely motivated by self interest. We establish that even without external punishment of violation of social norms, if a sufficiently large fraction of the population consists of Kantian agents, the tragedy of the commons can be substantially mitigated.作者: 詞匯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 19:47 作者: 車床 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:34
On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products, of the innovation effect is introduced. This perspective allows us to attribute the differences in results to either the length of the planning horizon or to our model’s formalization. Besides its contribution to the literature on pricing and diffusion, this paper highlights the sensitivity of resu作者: Compass 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 03:49
Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Price-Dependent Returns,meter deters the manufacturer to accept any sharing agreements. Further, firms coordinate the CLSC when the sharing parameter is medium independent of the negative impact of pricing on returns. When the sharing parameter is too high the retailer never opts for an RSC. We find that the magnitude of p作者: Tempor 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:59 作者: 獨(dú)裁政府 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:18 作者: engrave 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 13:31
Analogue Electronics for Higher Studiesmeter deters the manufacturer to accept any sharing agreements. Further, firms coordinate the CLSC when the sharing parameter is medium independent of the negative impact of pricing on returns. When the sharing parameter is too high the retailer never opts for an RSC. We find that the magnitude of p作者: 隱士 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 18:19
Unterscheidung von Tier- und Pflanzen?leniance equilibrium characteristic of an isolated population of Sanchos. Correspondingly, we analyze the conditions under which the interaction with the population of selfish Sanchos increases or decreases the compliance rate among altruistic Quixotes.作者: noxious 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 00:19 作者: Allege 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 05:52 作者: pericardium 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 09:41
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-9383-3re particularly, we introduce the impact of prices on one of the factors that affect the diffusion of new products: the innovation coefficient. By doing so, we relax one of the hypotheses in the existing literature stating that this rate is constant. In order to assess the impact of this functional 作者: 分開 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 10:38
Problems with Rule Descriptions of Language,acturer, two-retailer channel and develop a two-period model where consumers’ preferences are distributed along a Hotelling line. The rebate consists in a price discount that can be redeemed on the second period. We solve three Stackelberg games: a benchmark where no rebate is offered, a symmetric g作者: 描繪 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 17:12
H. van Honten,C. W. J. Beenakkercally integrated firms, whenever this is efficient for firms. This is particularly relevant when the vertical externality provokes distortions in the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D or advertising. The present model illustrates the possibility of using two-part tariffs endogenously defined as lin作者: 字的誤用 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 18:42 作者: erythema 時(shí)間: 2025-4-2 01:32
Analogue Electronics for Higher Studiese selling price. Both strategies influence the return rate, which is a state variable. The pricing strategy plays a key role in the identification of the best contract to achieve coordination as well as in achieving environmental objectives. The pricing strategy influences the return rate negatively作者: Maximizer 時(shí)間: 2025-4-2 03:28
Introduction: A New Instrument of Science?, a necessary net-zero emission of GHGs in order to stabilize climate over the long term. We start from a situation where . coalitions exist and behave as . players in a game of sharing a global emission budget that can only be maintained by negative emission activities. We compare a fully “cooperati作者: pessimism 時(shí)間: 2025-4-2 10:46 作者: 會(huì)議 時(shí)間: 2025-4-2 13:44
Abstimmungsmacht in Unternehmen,tions in three sections. The first group of contributions compares the observed behavior to different cooperative and noncooperative theoretical benchmarks. The second group covers contributions that design experiments that aim to find behavioral support for the use of specific types of strategies.
