標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory for Security and Risk Management; From Theory to Pract Stefan Rass,Stefan Schauer Book 2018 Springer International Publishing A [打印本頁] 作者: 中產(chǎn)階級 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:33
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書目名稱Game Theory for Security and Risk Management讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory for Security and Risk Management讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Pathogen 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:53
Book 2018izing the importance of connecting theory and practice, they detail the steps involved in selecting, adapting, and analyzing game-theoretic models in security engineering and provide case studies of successful implementations in different application domains. ?Practitioners who are not experts in ga作者: TRACE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:50 作者: CORE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:31 作者: 支柱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:33
What to Do When You’ve Been Hitch (even total) stochastic order, we give a complete construction, accompanied by examples and procedures how to get a (stochastically optimal) decision. A discussion of how game theory can be put on top of the stochastic order, as well as how the ordering can be applied to general IT risk management closes the chapter.作者: placebo-effect 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:09 作者: placebo-effect 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 17:37 作者: judiciousness 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:10
Optimal Dispatch of Electrical Transmission Systems Considering Interdependencies with Natural Gas S system. A co-simulation platform is built in MATLAB environment. We evaluate the proposed model using the IEEE 14-bus system and a corresponding natural gas transmission system. According to the simulation results, the reliability of the power system is improved when interdependency constraints are considered.作者: nautical 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:49
Utilizing Game Theory for Security Risk Assessmentnd terminology to provide further insight into how game theory can be utilized for risk assessment. In addition, we provide our view on how cooperative game theoretical model may be used to capture opportunity risk, which is usually overlooked in many classical risk assessment methods.作者: Override 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:13
A Scalable Decomposition Method for the Dynamic Defense of Cyber Networks one another with the goal of achieving network-wide security. The local defense problem’s construction is based on a decomposition of the network into clusters. For the decomposition, we use the notion of an influence graph to describe the dependencies among the security states of the network’s nod作者: 倒轉(zhuǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:31 作者: 流利圓滑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:17 作者: Intend 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:21
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Securing Interdependent Assets in Networkstimal defense allocation by a central authority and the (decentralized) problem of computing the best response for a single defender can be formulated as convex optimization problems. We then show that our framework can be applied to determine deployment of moving target defense (MTD) in networks. W作者: 使成整體 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:15
Random Damage in Interconnected Networksn is known, it is possible to estimate the payoff distribution by means of a stochastic spreading model. To this extend, the underlying network is modeled as a graph whose edges are classified depending on their properties. Each of these classes has a different probability of failure (e.g. probabili作者: Clumsy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:13 作者: 辯論 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:56
Security and Interdependency in a Public Cloud: A Game-Theoretic Approachpetition among rational agents. This work will show that there are multiple Nash equilibria of the public cloud game. The Nash equilibrium profile that results will be shown to depend on several factors, including the probability that the hypervisor is compromised given a successful attack on a user作者: insightful 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:40
A Risk Management Approach for Highly Interconnected Networks the heart of this process, a novel game-theoretic approach for risk minimization and risk treatment is applied. This approach is specifically designed to take the information coming from the various tools into account and model the complex interplay between the heterogeneous networks, systems, and 作者: LINE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:19 作者: 炸壞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:40
Assessing the Impact of Malware Attacks in Utility Networks virus, etc.) as well as on the type of the connection between the nodes (e.g., physical or logical connections). In this chapter, we illustrate how the abstract model can be put into practice for a concrete use case.作者: 合并 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:18 作者: Cirrhosis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:24 作者: 準(zhǔn)則 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:03
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-09030-2nd terminology to provide further insight into how game theory can be utilized for risk assessment. In addition, we provide our view on how cooperative game theoretical model may be used to capture opportunity risk, which is usually overlooked in many classical risk assessment methods.作者: PON 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:03
,Therapeutische Ans?tze und Prophylaxe, one another with the goal of achieving network-wide security. The local defense problem’s construction is based on a decomposition of the network into clusters. For the decomposition, we use the notion of an influence graph to describe the dependencies among the security states of the network’s nod作者: auxiliary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:47 作者: bonnet 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:17 作者: 背叛者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:48
Molecular genetics of Alzheimer diseasetimal defense allocation by a central authority and the (decentralized) problem of computing the best response for a single defender can be formulated as convex optimization problems. We then show that our framework can be applied to determine deployment of moving target defense (MTD) in networks. W作者: Dedication 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:31
Advances in Alzheimer Disease Therapyn is known, it is possible to estimate the payoff distribution by means of a stochastic spreading model. To this extend, the underlying network is modeled as a graph whose edges are classified depending on their properties. Each of these classes has a different probability of failure (e.g. probabili作者: ANN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:03
Biosociality, Biovalue, and the AD Commons,nce of backup control equipment in the communication infrastructure. We analyze different types of interactions between the attacker and the defender and propose methodologies to assess the initial security risk on communication equipment and the parameters of the analytical model used to evaluate t作者: 邊緣帶來墨水 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:33
Marcia L. Morris,Leonard L. Hestonpetition among rational agents. This work will show that there are multiple Nash equilibria of the public cloud game. The Nash equilibrium profile that results will be shown to depend on several factors, including the probability that the hypervisor is compromised given a successful attack on a user作者: iodides 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:33 作者: Infect 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:49
Eva-Maria Mandelkow,E. Thies,E. Mandelkowion is achieved, and to exfiltrate data or cause failures inside the system. In this chapter, we demonstrate how a set of processes developed in the context of HyRiM’s framework can assist in minimizing the damage caused to a utility organization that is subjected to an APT style of attack. Specific作者: ventilate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:01
Focus on Tauopathies and Beyond, virus, etc.) as well as on the type of the connection between the nodes (e.g., physical or logical connections). In this chapter, we illustrate how the abstract model can be put into practice for a concrete use case.作者: mydriatic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:50 作者: 圓桶 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:30 作者: 蹣跚 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:52
2363-8516 ng the different application areas discussed. ?Finally, in the third part, case studies from business and industry of successful applications of game-theoretic models are presented, and the range of application978-3-030-09186-6978-3-319-75268-6Series ISSN 2363-8516 Series E-ISSN 2363-8524 作者: 金絲雀 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:48
Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications380508.jpg作者: 出生 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:40
Book 2018ted, and analyzed. ?Surveillance systems, interconnected networks, and power grids are among the different application areas discussed. ?Finally, in the third part, case studies from business and industry of successful applications of game-theoretic models are presented, and the range of application作者: 沙發(fā) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:23 作者: 奇怪 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:43
Decision Making When Consequences Are Randomommonly, decision options are rated based on their expected utility. This approach is intuitive and successful in many cases, but has difficulties when the utility to be associated with an action is unknown or at least uncertain. Both problems can be addressed by accepting randomness as an intrinsic作者: 巨碩 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 13:24 作者: craving 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:43
A Scalable Decomposition Method for the Dynamic Defense of Cyber Networksacks and the network’s security status and instead must use its imperfect observations to determine a defense strategy. The nature of the defender’s imperfect information is assumed to be non-probabilistic. Thus, the defender takes a conservative (minmax) approach to defending the network, attemptin作者: 諂媚于性 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:16
Factored Markov Game Theory for Secure Interdependent Infrastructure Networksnet of Things (IoTs), the CIs are becoming vulnerable to cyber threats at the same time improving its connectivity and functionalities. Hence it is essential to understand the risk of ICTs on CIs holistically as a cyber-physical system and design efficient security hardening mechanisms to reduce the作者: 保全 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:18
G-DPS: A Game-Theoretical Decision-Making Framework for Physical Surveillance Gamescent terrorist attacks bring critical infrastructure into a severer environment. Many critical infrastructures, in particular those operating large industry complexes, incorporate some kind of physical surveillance technologies to secure their premises. Surveillance systems, such as access control a作者: 施魔法 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:11
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Securing Interdependent Assets in Networksakeholders. The interdependencies between the assets play a critical role in the security of the overall system, especially against strategic attackers who exploit these interdependencies to target valuable assets. In this work, we develop a general game-theoretic framework to model the security inv作者: 永久 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:35
Random Damage in Interconnected Networkse modeled using a game-theoretic approach. Preparing a game require several steps, including the definition of attack and defense strategies, estimation of payoffs, etc. Specifically, during the preparation of a game, the estimation of payoffs (i.e. damage) for each possible scenario is one of its c作者: COMMA 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:48 作者: ABYSS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:08
Managing Security Risks Interdependencies Between ICT and Electric Infrastructures: A Game Theoreticshelf operating systems in the communication infrastructure has the potential to increase the attack surface of the power grid. In this chapter, we address the issue of the security risk management of interdependent communication and electric infrastructures in the smart grid by proposing an analyti作者: Instrumental 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:43
Security and Interdependency in a Public Cloud: A Game-Theoretic Approachc cloud computing is cost-effective: a cloud user can reduce spending on technology infrastructure and have easy access to their information without an up-front or long-term commitment of resources. Despite such benefits, concern over cyber security deters many large organizations with sensitive inf作者: 易彎曲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:26
A Risk Management Approach for Highly Interconnected Networks of potential threats and security issues as well as a proper assessment of the respective risks is a core duty of utility providers. Despite the fact that utility providers operate several networks (e.g., communication, control, and utility networks), most of today’s risk management tools only focu作者: 吞下 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:21
Protecting Water Utility Networks from Advanced Persistent Threats: A Case Studyotection of utilities that provision critical services (e.g., water, electricity, telecommunications) is of vital importance given the severity imposed by any failure of these services. Recent security incidents in the context of critical infrastructures indicate that threats in such environments ap作者: ENACT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 08:34 作者: flex336 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 16:27 作者: Itinerant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 17:21 作者: progestin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:44
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-09030-2th an ability to comprehend security risks, organizations can make effective decision to allocate their budget to mitigate or treat those risks (often based on the severity of the risk). Thus, it is paramount to identify and assess risk scenarios properly to manage those risks. Subjective judgment d作者: 監(jiān)禁 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 03:50
What to Do When You’ve Been Hitommonly, decision options are rated based on their expected utility. This approach is intuitive and successful in many cases, but has difficulties when the utility to be associated with an action is unknown or at least uncertain. Both problems can be addressed by accepting randomness as an intrinsic
