標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory for Networks; 8th International EA Konstantin Avrachenkov,Longbo Huang,Anastasios Gio Conference proceedings 2019 ICST Institut [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: graphic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:28
書(shū)目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)
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書(shū)目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
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書(shū)目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次
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書(shū)目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Gerontology 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:36
Games and Random Searche properties of random search algorithms. Specifically using this technique in the context of Game Theory we show that stochastic better response dynamics, where players in the potential game perform their moves independently choosing the random strategy improving their outcome, converges in stochas作者: 安定 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:07
Optimal Resource Allocation over Networks via Lottery-Based Mechanismsed over deterministic allocations by implementing lotteries. We formulate an optimization problem, called the system problem, to find the optimal lottery allocation. The system problem exhibits a two-layer structure comprised of a permutation profile and optimal allocations given the permutation pro作者: RODE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:05 作者: Metamorphosis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:51
Using Bankruptcy Rules to Allocate CO2 Emission PermitsCO2 emissions permits is higher than what the planet can sustain. This situation can be considered as a bankruptcy problem, where the sum of players’ claims exceeds the endowment of the resource. In this paper, we use an approach based on bankruptcy solutions (in particular, on the Weighted Constrai作者: 放牧 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:54
The Economics of Bundling Content with Unlicensed Wireless Service risk of becoming congested, and service providers (SPs) may have difficulty to differentiate their wireless services when offering them on the same unlicensed spectrum. When SPs offer identical services, the resulting competition can lead to zero profits. In this work, we consider the case where an作者: 放牧 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:42 作者: 強(qiáng)壯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:43
Bargaining in Networks with Socially-Aware Agentsle graphs, and for bargaining games whose underlying combinatorial optimization problems are packing-type. Our results are threefold. First, we study bargaining games whose underlying combinatorial optimization problems are .. Second, we extend the study of stability notions when the networks are in作者: 陶器 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:50
Consensus Reaching with Heterogeneous User Preferencesile minimizing the cost paid to the platform. Prosumers, who have the possibility to generate energy, self-consume part of it to maximize their usage benefit and sell the rest to the platform to maximize their revenue. Product differentiation is introduced and consumers can specify preferences regar作者: Paradox 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-9983-5. On top of the platform, a trust-based mechanism combining exploitation of nodes with good reputation and exploration of new nodes, is implemented to determine the miner node which validates the transactions. A case study is provided to analyze the impact of preferences and miner selection dynamic 作者: IST 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:44
Konstantin Avrachenkov,Longbo Huang,Anastasios Gio作者: Deject 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:16
Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering380507.jpg作者: 感激小女 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:36 作者: anniversary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:45
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16989-3artificial intelligence; communications; computer science; cooperative game; Economics; game theory; infor作者: 肥料 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:31 作者: 柳樹(shù)；枯黃 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:34
Basant K. Kapur,Kim-Chong Chonge properties of random search algorithms. Specifically using this technique in the context of Game Theory we show that stochastic better response dynamics, where players in the potential game perform their moves independently choosing the random strategy improving their outcome, converges in stochas作者: Panacea 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:44
,T?tigkeiten und Engagement im Ruhestand,ed over deterministic allocations by implementing lotteries. We formulate an optimization problem, called the system problem, to find the optimal lottery allocation. The system problem exhibits a two-layer structure comprised of a permutation profile and optimal allocations given the permutation pro作者: 容易懂得 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:57 作者: Banquet 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:31 作者: 姑姑在炫耀 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12620-2 risk of becoming congested, and service providers (SPs) may have difficulty to differentiate their wireless services when offering them on the same unlicensed spectrum. When SPs offer identical services, the resulting competition can lead to zero profits. In this work, we consider the case where an作者: Adj異類的 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:46 作者: 高爾夫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:15
Allen C. Alfrey,Daniel C. Fromentle graphs, and for bargaining games whose underlying combinatorial optimization problems are packing-type. Our results are threefold. First, we study bargaining games whose underlying combinatorial optimization problems are .. Second, we extend the study of stability notions when the networks are in作者: STELL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:01
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-9983-5ile minimizing the cost paid to the platform. Prosumers, who have the possibility to generate energy, self-consume part of it to maximize their usage benefit and sell the rest to the platform to maximize their revenue. Product differentiation is introduced and consumers can specify preferences regar作者: discord 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:14 作者: phase-2-enzyme 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:40 作者: dithiolethione 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:11 作者: 大量 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:11
978-3-030-16988-6ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2019作者: GLIB 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:56 作者: Seizure 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:35
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137391537We study the problem of . in multiple independent . as a .. We show that in the unique . of the game the . of the transmitter is the . to the sum of the jamming and the noise power in each channel and the . of the jammer is the . only to the noise power.作者: 自作多情 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:30 作者: BAN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:36 作者: 陪審團(tuán)每個(gè)人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:19 作者: Repetitions 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:21 作者: Antecedent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:49
Bargaining in Networks with Socially-Aware Agentsese new stability notions admit intuitive interpretations touching on . agents. Overall, our contributions are meant to identify natural and desirable bargaining outcomes as well as to characterize powerful positions in bargaining networks.作者: Missile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:42
Conference proceedings 2019nce, in April 2019.. The 8 full and 3 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 17 submissions. They are organized in the following topical sections: Game Theory for Wireless Networks; Games for Economy and Resource Allocation; and Game Theory for Social Networks..作者: 惡臭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:13 作者: 拔出 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:10 作者: 大炮 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12196-2traints. We have succeeded in showing that the utilities satisfy the property of diagonal strict concavity (DSC), which can be viewed as an extension of concavity to a game setting. It not only guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium but also of the normalized equilibrium.作者: 含糊其辭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 07:33
Two-Level Cooperation in Network Games allocate the value in two steps using the Shapley value and show the difference with the classical one-step allocation procedure. We then adopt this approach for games with pairwise interactions and provide relations between several definitions of the characteristic function and the corresponding Shapley values.作者: Oafishness 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:28 作者: Gnrh670 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:26
Normalized Equilibrium in Tullock Rent Seeking Gametraints. We have succeeded in showing that the utilities satisfy the property of diagonal strict concavity (DSC), which can be viewed as an extension of concavity to a game setting. It not only guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium but also of the normalized equilibrium.作者: 溫室 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:53
Using Bankruptcy Rules to Allocate CO2 Emission Permitsclaims exceeds the endowment of the resource. In this paper, we use an approach based on bankruptcy solutions (in particular, on the Weighted Constrained Equal Awards rule) in order to propose a more efficient and fair allocation protocol for sharing CO2 emissions permits among the EU-28 countries.作者: Abutment 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:38 作者: Induction 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:00
Soziale Normen und altruistisches Verhalten,ion probabilities associated with different invader types. Waterfilling equations are derived, which allows one to determine these detection probabilities. Bands where the Invader’s strategies have band-sharing form are identified. The sensitivity of the strategies to the subjective factors and a priori probabilities are numerically illustrated.作者: 辯論的終結(jié) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:24
,T?tigkeiten und Engagement im Ruhestand,ices. We show that the system problem has a duality gap, in general, and that the primal problem is NP-hard. We then consider a relaxation of the system problem and derive some qualitative features of the optimal lottery structure.作者: floaters 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 15:24 作者: PATRI 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:40
Optimal Resource Allocation over Networks via Lottery-Based Mechanismsices. We show that the system problem has a duality gap, in general, and that the primal problem is NP-hard. We then consider a relaxation of the system problem and derive some qualitative features of the optimal lottery structure.作者: TAIN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:14
